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1 Introduction	and	thesis	objectives	
Risk	and	threat	models	are	cornerstones	of	software	development	security.	Basically,	
their	feasibility	has	been	proven	on	operating	systems	development;	however,	now	
they	are	coming	into	wider	usage	on	tailored	applications	and	systems.	The	idea	of	
this	thesis	is	to	explore	risk	and	security	models	that	have	helped	companies	to	lo-
cate	flaws	in	software	architecture	and	software	and	eventually	select	or	develop	a	
model	for	health	care	software	development.	Moreover,	the	thesis	can	give	a	direc-
tion	and	new	methods	for	software	development	teams	and	management.		
	
1.1 Background	for	Problem	
Health	care	has	been	traditionally	a	safe	harbour	from	the	Internet’s	and	other	to-
day’s	network	threats	since	it	has	been	separated	from	public	networks;	however,	
the	world	is	now	changing	much	faster	than	few	decades	before.	Basically,	the	most	
important	physics	laws	and	secrets	have	been	revealed;	however,	networking	and	
social	networks	are	going	through	a	continuous	and	huge	change.	Social	networks	
might	be	in	key	position	for	future	society	even	though	they	are	considered	enter-
tainment	instead	of	serious	communication	media.	
	
For	example,	over	20	years	ago	everyone	got	most	of	their	news	and	new	data	from	
TV	news	and	newspapers.	The	information	was	often	hours	or	even	days	old.	The	
Internet	era	changed	data	delivery	very	quickly	and	the	first	home	pages	emerged.	
Social	networking	services	and	smartphones	with	cameras	added	even	more	speed	
to	information	delivery.	It	is	a	benefit;	however,	it	is	also	a	threat	since	basically	near-
ly	any	data	can	be	stolen	and	shared	in	real-time.	For	example,	sharing	celebrities’	
personal	life	data	and	photos	is	popular	fun	for	a	large	group	of	people.		
	
Moreover,	people	tend	to	be	curious	to	get	personal	health	data,	particularly	when	
speaking	about	relatives,	a	former	spouse	or	even	a	famous	person.	One	well-known	
example	in	2013	was	Michael	Schumacher’s	skiing	accident	in	December	2013	(BBC	
Sport,	2013).	Eventually	the	rumours	flew	concerning	Schumacher’s	health.	The	case	
		13	
was	an	interesting	target	for	tabloid	press	and	individuals.	It	was	obvious	that	some	
people	filmed	him	at	hospital,	and	stealing	or	getting	personal	health	data	was	
tempting	as	well.	As	a	proof	of	rumours	and	general	interest	in	health	data	in	March	
2015,	Schumacher	doctor’s	laptop	was	stolen	(Narciso,	2015).		
	
Based	on	an	article	written	in	Wired	magazine	article,	security	researchers	examined	
the	security	of	hospital	networks	and	found	many	of	them	“leaking	valuable	infor-
mation	to	the	internet,	leaving	critical	systems	and	equipment	vulnerable	to	hacking”	
(Zetter,	2009).		The	article	also	mentions	that	the	problem	was	an	unpatched	com-
puter	with	an	Internet	connection.	Exploiting	was	easy	without	user	interaction	and	
after	that	the	road	was	open	to	medical	devices	that	the	user	wanted	to	attack	(Zet-
ter,	2009).	One	shortcoming	of	health	care	organizations	was	that	they	do	not	take	
security	seriously	and	security	flaws	exist	in	most	of	the	health	care	devices.	The	arti-
cle	mentioned	flaws	that	were	find	in	defibrillators	and	infusion	pumps,	and	the	at-
tacker	could	simply	manipulate	dosages	or	give	shocks	to	a	patient’s	heart	remotely.	
	
Zetter	lists	systems	with	were	exposed	as	follows:	
“Among	the	systems	with	exposed	data,	the	researchers	easily	identified	at	least	32	
pacemaker	systems	in	the	organization,	21	anesthesiology	systems,	488	cardiology	
systems,	and	323	PACS	systems—radiology	systems	for	reading	X-Rays	and	other	im-
ages.	They	also	identified	telemetry	systems,	high-risk	systems	that	are	often	used	in	
infant-abduction	prevention	systems	as	well	as	for	monitoring	the	movement	of	el-
derly	patients	throughout	a	hospital	to	ensure	they	do	not	wander	off.”	(Zetter,	
2009).		
	
One	example	of	an	internal	threat	was	a	case	in	Jyväskylä	where	city	health	care	em-
ployee	snooped	over	100	patients’	data	without	any	kind	of	permission	or	reason.	
The	follow-up	of	the	patient	data	was	done	with	random	log	audits	(Doagu,	2012).	
Based	on	the	previous	article	such	cases	are	rare,	and	in	particular,	when	snooping	a	
wide	group	of	people.	Since	the	entire	log	data	is	not	checked	for	all	employees	with	
audits,	there	is	still	a	possibility	that	someone	might	snoop	data	without	ever	getting	
caught,	especially	if	snooping	is	carried	out	in	a	deceptive	way	for	a	selected	target.	
	
		14	
1.2 Requirement	for	Development	
Security	has	always	been	an	important	issue	on	health	care	area	and	will	remain	so,	
however,	the	threats	and	risks	are	continuously	changing.	As	mentioned	in	chapter	
1.1,	many	medical	equipment	contained	security	vulnerabilities.	The	basis	of	this	
thesis	was	to	study	the	security	area	and	particularly	the	risk	and	threat	analysis	
models,	and	test	whether	they	apply	to	software	development	within	health	care.	
The	objective	was	to	mitigate	the	previously	mentioned	risks	and	threats.	Additional-
ly,	the	aim	was	to	develop	a	new	generic	model	combining	the	best	parts	of	the	ex-
isting	models,	and	that	suits	the	health	care	area	in	particular.	
	
1.3 Research	Problem	
Tieto	Health	care	needs	a	new	risk	and	threat	model	as	an	approach	for	long	term	
software	development	and	maintenance.	With	the	model	software	development	
teams	and	management	should	overcome	security	based	risks	and	threats	in	the	fu-
ture.	Eventually	the	goal	is	to	develop	a	new	model	based	on	the	best	parts	of	exist-
ing	models.	The	selected	models	are	tested	with	real	software	teams	on	Tieto’s	
healthcare	&	welfare	organization.	Tieto’s	healthcare	unit	requires	that	the	model	is	
easy	to	use	and	the	usage	of	the	model	should	not	consume	a	great	deal	of	time.	The	
model	should	reveal	the	threats	in	effective	way	without	too	strict	formality.	Too	
formal	or	very	complicated	model	would	not	be	applicable	in	long	term	usage	since	
teams	are	using	the	agile	methods.	
	
1.4 Research	Questions	
The	research	problem	is	basically	generic	for	all	organizations	that	develop	software	
for	health	care	area.	Based	on	that,	the	following	primary	research	questions	were	
recognized.	
	
1. What	appropriate	risk	and	security	models	already	exist?	
2. Which	existing	risk	and	security	model	fits	best	for	health	care	software	de-
velopment	processes?	
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3. What	are	the	weaknesses	of	existing	models?	
4. Does	the	developed	health	care	specific	risk	and	threat	model	offer	better	
risk	and	security	management	than	generic	models?	
	
1.5 Research	Plan	
The	following	steps	are	included	in	this	thesis	as	follows:		
	
• Research	what	risk	and	security	models	are	available.	
• Investigate	health	care	software	area	security	issues.	
• Research	theory	based	models	based	on	literature	analysis.		
• Select	2	–	3	threat	models	for	practical	test	for	the	development	team(s)	
• Give	guidance	regarding	to	the	threat	model	for	the	development	team	
• The	development	team	applies	the	threat	model	to	the	daily	software	devel-
opment	work	
• The	development	team	opinions	are	collected	within	an	online	questionnaire	
as	primary	data	collection	method.	
• Documentary	data	as	secondary	method	to	find	out	threat	model	advantages	
and	disadvantages	from	the	news	archives,	the	information	security	theses	
and	the	security	books.	
• Estimate	feasibility	of	models	and	possible	changes	required	for	them.	
• Evaluate	the	risk	and	threat	models	based	on	collected	data	and	literature	re-
view.	
	
1.6 Research	Method	
The	selection	of	the	research	method	started	with	the	investigation	of	the	research	
onion	model	(Saunders,	Lewis	&	Thornhill,	2012,	128).	This	philosophy	was	selected	
due	to	the	demand	to	apply	invented	or	found	methods	to	support	product	lines	and	
their	projects	in	a	relevant	way.	The	research	questions	can	be	considered	unambig-
uous;	however,	they	do	not	define	the	particular	philosophy	thus	giving	a	possibility	
to	use	different	philosophical	viewpoints	if	needed	(Saunders,	Lewis	&	Thornhill,	
2012,	130).	The	selected	research	approach	is	abduction	since	a	possibility	to	move	
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from	theory	to	data	and	vice	versa.	Eventually	the	idea	was	to	apply	existing	models	
to	get	data	but	also	tuning	the	selected	models	based	on	collected	data.	(Saunders,	
Lewis	&	Thornhill,	2012,	130).	Methodological	choice	selected	was	multi-method	
qualitative	study	and	in	this	thesis	it	intended	to	be	done	with	interviews	and	shad-
owing	software	development	teams	at	work.	(Saunders,	Lewis	&	Thornhill,	2012,	
165).		However;	shadowing	was	not	possible	from	Tieto’s	side	due	to	too	long	shad-
owing	time.	Estimated	shadowing	time	was	minimum	2	weeks	which	means	one	de-
velopment	sprint	length.	Eventually	it	was	decided	to	select	literature	analysis	as	the	
primary	method	and	a	self-completed	questionnaire	as	a	secondary	method	so	the	
model	evaluation	is	possible	with	the	one	or	more	development	teams.	The	selected	
strategy	for	the	research	is	case	study	and	ideally	it	is	a	good	way	to	explore	a	re-
search	topic	in	product	lines	and	projects	of	real	software	development.	The	chosen	
time	horizon	selected	was	cross-sectional.	The	longitudinal	approach	would	give	bet-
ter	results	in	this	case.	
	
Table	1.	Selected	research	philosophies	and	approaches	
Research	philosophies	and	approaches	 Selection	
Philosophy Pragmatism 
Approach Abduction 
Methodological	choice Multi-method	qualitative	study	(The	
primary	method	is	literature	analysis,	the	
secondary	method	is	a	self-completed	
questionnaire)	
Strategy Case	study 
Time	horizon Cross-sectional. 
Research	design	 Case	study	
 
 
2 Health	care	specific	Security	risks		
PwC	reports	yearly	the	security	snapshot	for	each	industry	area.	The	cyber	security	
challenges	report	2014	on	the	field	of	healthcare	industry	describes	top	5	security	
challenges	in	2014	and	outlook	to	the	security	area.	The	data	is	collected	by	PwC	
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from	“The	Global	State	of	Information	Security	Survey	2015”.		As	seen	on	Figure	1	
the	access	control	and	identity	management	for	end	users	are	clearly	on	highest	
place.	The	data	leakage,	cloud	computing,	encryption	in	storage	and	in	transit	and	
regulatory	requirements	are	following	with	high	percentage.	Some	of	the	new	ad-
vanced	technologies	mentioned	in	the	report	are	Internet,	telemedicine,	mobile	de-
vices,	social	media,	information	sharing	and	Big	Data	analytics.	The	report	underlines	
that	technology	transforms	healthcare	payers	and	providers’	interaction	with	their	
patients,	business	partners,	and	regulators.		(PwC,	2014).		
	
	
Figure	1.	“Top	5	security	challenges	in	2014“.	(PwC,	2014).	
	
The	sources	of	the	incidents	are	definitely	worth	of	investigation	to	understand	what	
the	most	likely	human	based	attacking	vector	is	that	should	be	prevented	or	mitigat-
ed.	According	to	PwC,	current	employees	are	still	the	highest	risk	to	cause	new	secu-
rity	incidents;	however,	also	former	employees	and	hackers	are	common	threats.	
The	threat	of	foreign	nation-states	has	grown	from	2%	to	5%,	and	thus	it	is	a	fast	
growing	threat	that	must	be	taken	into	account	(PwC,	2014).	
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Figure	2.	“Sources	of	Incidents”	(PwC,	2014)	
	
According	to	PwC,	“Medical	records	are	more	valuable	because	cybercriminals	can	
use	them	to	create	an	identity,	as	well	as	carry	out	sophisticated	insurance	fraud	
schemes”	(PwC,	2014).		Based	on	the	report,	the	implementation	of	the	electronic	
health	records	is	the	highest	risk;	however,	also	data	sharing	in	different	forms	plays	
a	very	significant	role.	Careless	data	sharing	might	lead	to	unwanted	data	disclosure.	
	
	
Figure	3.	“EHRs	continue	to	drive	security	investment”	(PwC,	2014)	
	
	
As	a	conclusion,	PcW	report	on	internal	threats,	software	implementation,	data	shar-
ing,	new	technology	and	top	security	threats	shows	the	roadmap	for	future;	howev-
er,	it	is	not	limited	to	them.	The	selected	threat	model	should	meet	today’s	security	
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requirements	to	prevent	or	mitigate	the	security	risks;	however,	the	threat	model	
should	be	flexible	and	easy	to	apply	for	future	threats	or	other	threats	that	are	not	
listed	on	the	security	report.	
	
	
3 Threat	Models		
This	part	of	the	document	describes	the	theory	of	threat	models.	Several	different	
threat	models	and	threat	modelling	approaches	are	described.	
	
	
3.1 Threat	models	theory	
Threat	models	can	be	considered	as	any	models	the	purpose	of	which	is	to	help	to	
solve	and	overcome	certain	problems.	The	simplified	threat	model	is	basically	a	high	
level	description	of	how	the	attacker	could	exploit	the	possible	vulnerabilities	on	the	
application	environment	(Velez	&	Morana	2015,	1-3).	According	to	(Velez	&	Morana	
2015,	1);	the	generic	application	threat	model	definition	includes	strategic	process,	
attack	scenarios,	vulnerabilities,	application	environment	and	identification	of	the	
risk	and	impact	levels.	Software	development	security	and	war	strategies	share	many	
similarities	as	both	have	malicious	attackers	and	defeating	of	enemy	requires	always	
having	a	better	strategy	than	the	enemy.	
	
	Harris	described	the	threat	as	follows:	“A	threat	is	any	potential	danger	that	is	asso-
ciated	with	the	exploitation	of	a	vulnerability.	The	threat	is	that	someone,	or	some-
thing,	will	identify	a	specific	vulnerability	and	use	it	against	the	company	or	individu-
al”.	(Harris,	S.	2014).	According	to	Shostack	(2014,	3),	threat	modelling	is	simply	way	
to	find	security	problems	beforehand	and	see	the	bigger	picture	instead	of	the	code.		
	
For	example,	if	software	is	developed	without	taking	threats	into	account	the	soft-
ware	might	be	delivered	to	a	customer	and	everything	seems	to	be	fine	for	a	long	
time.	A	bunch	of	normal	bugs	might	be	fixed,	however,	there	is	no	feedback	of	secu-
rity	flaws	lurking	in	the	system.	A	disaster	may	follow	quickly	after	a	malicious	at-
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tacker	attacks	against	the	system.	To	overcome	threats	they	must	be	recognized	and	
handled	properly.	Overall	recognition	of	the	threats	might	be	easier	if	war	strategies	
and	generally	strategies	are	familiar	but	it	is	not	required	at	all.		The	next	paragraph	
discusses	a	fictional	account	as	an	example	of	losing	reputation	due	to	multiple	vul-
nerabilities.	(Velez	&	Morana	2015,	1-3)	
	
3.1.1 Threat	example	
An	example	system	handles	X-ray	images;	however,	it	is	running	on	an	obsolete	op-
erating	system	with	very	low	or	no	defence	against	intruders.	The	system	works	well,	
the	customer	is	satisfied	and	business	continues	without	problems.	Basically	every-
thing	works	fine	many	years	without	serious	problems.	One	day	the	hospital	takes	
care	of	a	famous	person	after	a	serious	accident.	Meanwhile,	youngsters	have	found	
that	one	of	the	hospital	computers	has	access	to	nearly	everywhere	in	the	hospital	
network.	Tabloid	press	looks	for	news	about	the	celebrity	and	the	youngsters	knows	
that	very	well.	A	computer	that	contains	X-ray	images	is	hidden	somewhere	in	the	
hospital	network;	however,	the	attackers	have	done	few	days	of	reconnaissance	and	
found	a	computer	with	many	other	interesting	targets.	
	
Because	the	system	itself	does	not	have	any	defence	or	strong	authentication	mech-
anisms,	collecting	images	is	very	easy.	After	a	few	days	the	X-ray	images	of	the	celeb-
rity	are	on	tabloid	press	and	the	attackers	got	some	extra	money.	A	lawyer	contacts	
the	hospital	and	soon	the	hospital	contacts	a	software	developer.	The	hospital	is	
found	guilty	for	abandoning	security	of	the	networks	and	the	tabloid	press	nails	the	
software	developer	down	and	causes	severe	damage	for	business	because	in	a	short	
time	an	important	contract	is	lost	for	competitor	due	to	better	security.	Luckily,	no-
one	died	because	of	the	mistake	because	soon	a	new	security	researcher	of	the	hos-
pital	found	a	security	flaw	in	a	Bluetooth-enabled	defibrillator	that	can	be	manipu-
lated	to	deliver	shocks	to	a	patient’s	heart.		
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3.1.2 Strategy	against	threats	and	the	security	concept	
The	following	citation	acts	as	a	guiding	principle	in	this	study	“Victorious	warriors	win	
first	and	then	go	to	war,	while	defeated	warriors	go	to	war	first	and	then	seek	to	
win”	(Tzu,	S.	1913).	Without	proper	modelling	and	planning	of	software	the	team	
develops	first	and	then	seeks	to	win	after	committing	Himalayan	blunder.	Definitely	
this	does	not	stand	for	endless	amount	of	planning	and	hundred	pages	specifications	
but	more	like	a	continuous	strategy	follow	up	with	situation	awareness	and	continu-
ous	thinking	in	the	changing	environment	and	world.		
	
The	following	figure	is	from	CISSP	Exam	guide	(Harris,	2014,	27)	and	explains	clearly	a	
threat	position	on	a	different	security	context.	As	seen	the	model	is	asset	based;	
however,	threats	can	be	handled.	In	the	previous	fictional	story	youngsters	were	
threat	agents	and	threat	was	an	exploitation	of	missing	or	weak	authentication	by-
passing.		Figure	4	describes	the	chain	of	the	threat	agent,	threat,	vulnerability,	risk,	
asset,	exposure	and	the	safeguard.	Understanding	of	the	chain	helps	to	understand	
the	role	of	the	threat	in	big	picture.	However;	it	is	worth	to	remember	that	evalua-
tion	of	the	threat	risk	can	help	to	make	decision	whether	the	impact	is	serious	
enough.	All	threats	and	risks	are	not	worth	to	prevent	or	mitigate.	
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Figure	4.	The	security	concepts	and	their	relationships	(adapted	from	Harris,	2014,	
27)	
3.2 DREAD	–	Risk	Assessment	Model	
DREAD	stands	for	Damage,	Reproducibility,	Exploitability,	Affected	users,	Discovera-
bility.	DREAD	uses	categories	to	assess	the	rating	of	a	threat.	Three	is	the	highest	
rating,	two	medium,	one	low	and	0	none.	The	ratings	can	be	summarized	for	given	
exploit	to	prioritize	exploit.	It	was	Microsoft’s	attempt	to	improve	security	with	risk	
modelling	during	software	development.	There	was	an	article	of	it	in	MSDN	2003	but	
support	for	DREAD	deceased	2010	(Shostack,	2014,	180).	However;	next	chapter	in-
cludes	short	description	how	the	risk	calculation	works	by	the	model.	
	 	
Threat'
Asset'
Risk'
Vulnerability'
Safeguard'
Threat'agent' The$a&acker$that$can$exploit$the$weaknesses$and$the$vulnerabili7es$
The$danger$that$the$a&acker$may$execute$
by$exploi7ng$the$vulnerability.$
The$known$or$unknown$weakness$or$
not$protected$with$the$safeguard$
The$probability$of$the$a&ack$due$to$vulnerability$
The$impact$of$the$possible$a&ack$
Any$valuable$thing,$data$or$person.$
The$countermeasure$that$mi7gates$or$prevents$the$a&ack.$
Exposure' The$vulnerability$exposes$a$threat$to$the$organiza7on$or$the$individual$
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Table	2.	DREAD	meaning	(Adapted	from	OWASP,	2015,	Risk	Threat	modelling)	
Word	 Description	
Damage	 Damage	stands	simply	for	the	serious-
ness	of	an	attack.	
Reproducibility	 Is	the	attack	repeatable	and	how	easy	
would	it	be	to	repeat	the	attack?	
Exploitability	 Exploitability	means	ease	of	the	attack.	
Affected	users	 Affected	users	stands	for	all	people	im-
pacted	by	an	attack	
Discoverability	 Discoverability	means	how	easy	is	it	to	
discover	the	exploit.	
	
3.2.1 DREAD	usage	
Calculating	risks	with	DREAD	is	based	on	risk	factors.	Each	term	gets	a	value	and	the	
sum	of	the	values	is	divided	by	constant	5	(amount	of	terms).	The	result	forms	the	
DREAD	risk	factor.	The	higher	the	factor	is	the	higher	the	risk	and	vice	versa.	
(OWASP,	2015,	Risk	Threat	modelling).		
	
Following	chapter	describes	short	instructions	for	the	quantifying	the	DREAD	risks	
(OWASP,	2015,	Risk	Threat	modelling):	
	
- Each	risk	gets	a	value	between	0	–	10.	Number	0	is	lowest	and	10	highest.	
- Quantify	the	each	category	with	questions.	Quantifying	depends	on	the	sys-
tem,	the	participants	and	planning	of	the	questions.	
- Review	and	iterate	to	find	best	set	of	the	questions	
	
Table	3.	DREAD	example	questions	(Adapted	from	OWASP,	2015,	Risk	Threat	model-
ling)	
Example	questions	 Example	answers	
How	much	damage	does	the	used	exploit	
cause?	
0	=	No	damage	
5	=	Medium	damage.		The	error	message	
and	the	user	name	with	address	re-
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vealed.	
10	=	Disastrous	damage,	all	patient	in-
formation	available.	
Is	it	possible	to	reproduce	the	attack?	 0	=	Very	difficult	or	impossible	
5	=	Gain	administrators	account	and	run	
it.	
10	=	Run	it	on	the	browser	without	user	
account.	
How	easy	is	it	to	attack?	What	is	needed?	 0	=	Not	possible	
5	=	Login	to	the	application	with	the	ad-
ministrator	account	needed	
10	=	Anyone	can	run	it	just	on	the	
browser	address	line	
Who	is	affected	by	the	attack?	 0	=	Nobody	
5	=	System	users	(administrators,	users)	
10	=	Company	users	and	company	web-
site	users.	
How	easy	is	it	to	find	the	exploit?	 0	=	Nearly	impossible	
5	=	Developer	with	good	hacking	skills	
can	find	it.	
10	=	Just	click	the	buttons	in	different	
order	
	
3.3 Brainstorming	as	an	threat	analysis	method		
Brainstorming	consists	of	two	parts,	the	first	phase	being	the	generation	of	new	ide-
as	and	the	second	phase	the	analysis	of	the	ideas.	The	goal	is	to	collect	all	ideas	in	
the	first	phase	without	judgment.	(Shostack,	2014,	31-34).		
	
3.3.1 Brainstorming	methods		
As	a	method	brainstorming	is	easy	to	arrange;	however,	its	results	might	be	difficult	
to	address.	Basically	brainstorming	may	give	interesting	viewpoints	for	risk	and	
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threat	analysis;	nevertheless,	it	works	only	as	supportive	action	since	threats	might	
be	completely	out	of	team	responsibility	area.		For	instance,	hardware	related	
threats	might	be	interesting	for	someone	in	user	interface	development	team,	how-
ever,	addressing	them	is	a	completely	different	story.	Typically	recognized	threats	
heavily	rely	on	participants’	experience	and	time	used	for	the	brainstorming	meeting.	
Additionally,	facilitation	of	the	meeting	is	essential	in	order	to	move	on.	The	team	
also	needs	a	technical	expert	of	the	area	so	that	the	evaluation	of	the	ideas	is	more	
successful,	and	more	used	time	for	brainstorming	stands	for	a	higher	quality	of	re-
sults.	Despite	facilitation	or	usage	of	time,	the	results	are	mostly	useless	whenever	
participants	are	not	interested	in	brainstorming	or	facilitation	is	badly	organized.	
Brainstorming	requires	removal	of	boundaries	and	scope	so	that	the	threats	may	be	
difficult	or	impossible	to	prove.		The	second	problem	is	to	define	the	exit	criteria	for	
the	brainstorming	since	boundaries	and	scope	are	removed	(Shostack,	2014,	31-34).	
	
3.3.2 Scenario	analysis	
Scenario	analysis	stands	for	written	scenarios	and	the	purpose	of	the	analysis	is	to	
ask	what	may	go	wrong	in	the	scenario.	As	an	example,	a	Hell’s	Angels	member	could	
get	a	bike	and	the	donor	could	think	what	that	person	could	do	with	the	bike:	drive	
to	church,	go	to	blackmail	someone,	sell	it	without	the	donor’s	knowledge	and	so	
forth.	(Shostack,	2014,	32).		
	
3.3.3 Pre-mortem	
Pre-mortem	stands	for	gathering	of	professionals	and	assignment	to	find	out	before-
hand	what	went	wrong	after	the	project	or	an	important	milestone.	Basically,	it	is	
just	an	imaginary	way	to	find	out	why	a	project	or	milestone	failed	before	the	real	
failure	even	happened.	Eventually,	the	idea	is	to	explore	why	participants	think	that	a	
product	will	fail	from	the	point	of	view	of	threat	or	risk.	(Shostack,	2014,	33).	
	
		26	
3.3.4 Movie	plotting	
In	movie	plotting	brainstorming	is	moved	under	movie	style	theme.	Attendees	will	
pick	one	or	more	movies	and	they	can	for	example	imagine	themselves	as	agents	
who	want	to	intercept	a	government	computer	through	the	Internet.	The	more	pro-
vocative	or	outrageous	the	ideas	are	the	more	they	should	help	to	generate	new	
ideas.	Eventually	trying	a	different	style	of	movies	and	roles	may	reveal	different	
styles	of	threats.	
	
Movie	plotting	is	more	entertaining	than	an	effective	way	to	recognize	attack	ideas.	
The	purpose	of	the	method	is	to	throw	fuel	on	fire	so	that	the	flow	of	ideas	will	be	
achieved	in	full	scale.	(Shostack,	2014,	33).	
	
3.3.5 Literature	review	
Literature	review	is	always	a	part	of	a	thesis;	however,	it	is	also	a	brainstorming	
method.	Basically,	similar	methods	that	are	applicable	for	thesis	literature	review	are	
applicable	for	literature	review	brainstorming.	For	instance,	different	kinds	of	search	
engines,	academic	literature	or	theses	can	reveal	many	new	ideas.	Also,	searching	
According	to	domestic	and	foreign	competitors’	products	related	threat	or	risk	in-
formation	might	be	helpful.	(Shostack,	2014,	33).	
	
3.4 Microsoft	Threat	Modelling	Methodology	
Microsoft	has	its	own	Threat	Modelling	technology	and	its	development	started	with	
a	directive	in	January	2002.	Actually	the	design	phase	threat	modelling	technology	is	
a	part	of	a	bigger	picture.	The	technology	was	developed	to	find	ways	to	improve	the	
existing	security	code.	Since	malicious	software	rose	after	the	millennium,	Microsoft	
was	forced	to	improve	the	software	security	and	they	have	continued	to	improve	it	
since	then.	(Microsoft,	2014).	
	
The	directive	was	written	by	Microsoft’s	Trustworthy	Computing	team	and	the	final	
result	was	Microsoft	Security	Development	Lifecycle.	The	policy	has	been	mandatory	
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in	Microsoft	since	2004,	and	it	is	part	of	the	software	development	process	(Mi-
crosoft,	2014).	After	one	year	usage	of	SDL	for	Windows	XP	and	Vista	vulnerabilities	
were	45%	less	than	previous	year	before	SDL	(Microsoft	Security	Development	
Lifecycle	Core	Training	Classes,	2010).	
	
Basically	methodology	is	strongly	directed	for	Microsoft	based	product	development;	
however,	not	limited	to.	Fundamental	principles	of	all	information	security	are	confi-
dentiality,	integrity	and	availability	(CIA)	supported	by	authorization,	authentication	
and	non-repudiation	(Harris,	S.	2014,	22-24).	Microsoft’s	model	uses	tailored	meth-
odology	to	meet	three	CIA	basic	tenets’	requirements	and	its	acronym	is	“STRIDE”	
(Spoofing,	Tampering,	Repudiation,	Information	disclosure,	Denial	of	Service	and	
Elevation	of	Privilege).	(Shostack,	2014,	66).	Basically	such	tailoring	gives	easier	con-
cepts	to	follow	and	strongly	supports	confidentiality,	integrity	and	availability	basic	
principles.	The	former	threat	model	before	STRIDE	used	by	Microsoft	was	DREAD.	
(Shostack,	2014,	180).	
	
The	SDL	contains	wide	range	of	threat	material	like	SDL	Process	Guidance,	SDL	Opti-
mization	Model,	SDL	Pro	Network,	SDL	Threat	Modelling	Tool	and	SDL	Process	Tem-
plates.	Their	original	upper	level	process	contained	process	phases	Training,	Re-
quirements,	Design,	Implementation,	Verification,	Release	and	Response.	Each	phase	
had	specific	requirements	and	the	threat	modelling	is	part	of	the	design	phase.	The	
one	part	of	security	is	handled	with	the	threat	modelling	in	design	phase.	After	the	
design	phase	all	features	and	the	product	architecture	are	reviewed	and	the	threats	
and	mitigations	are	recognized.	(Microsoft	Security	Development	Lifecycle	Core	
Training	Classes,	2010).	
	
3.4.1 SDL	Threat	Modelling	Process	and	the	tool	
The	following	figure	describes	the	current	Microsoft	SDL	thread	modelling	process	
from	a	point	of	planning	view	with	the	tool.	It	is	possible	to	use	the	process	on	the	
whiteboard,	however,	Microsoft	has	released	a	free	tool	for	drawing	threat	models	
for	the	software.	Since	Microsoft	uses	STRIDE	as	a	threat	model	the	tool	has	direct	
integration	for	STRIDE	per	each	element.	The	tool	is	targeted	for	developers,	thus	no	
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security	background	is	required.	Additionally,	SDL	Threat	Modelling	Tool	contains	
support	for	issue	tracking	systems	and	contains	reporting	capabilities.	(SDL	Threat	
Modelling	Tool,	2015).	
	
	
Figure	5.	SDL	Threat	Modelling	Process	(adapted	from	Microsoft	SDL	Team,	2015)	
	
The	methodology	is	built	to	use	the	graphical	data	flow	concept	that	includes	a	
standard	set	of	graphical	symbols.	Typically,	modelling	is	simply	a	concept	that	can	
be	applied	to	reality	in	many	different	ways.	Basically,	Microsoft	Threat	Modelling	
Methodology	can	be	applied	without	any	tool,	however,	Microsoft’s	strategy	has	
been	to	offer	tools	with	methods	so	customers	will	support	their	ecosystem.	Nothing	
prevents	from	using	the	tool	for	any	other	product	area	as	symbols	are	mostly	gener-
ic.	However,	many	stencil	names	are	Windows	branded	and	all	other	operating	sys-
tems	are	completely	missing.	User	can	rename	components’	captions	as	wanted;	
however,	the	original	properties	stay	as	constant.	In	other	words,	Windows	runtime	
caption	can	be	anything;	however,	the	property	name	“Windows	runtime”	is	con-
stant.	
	
As	a	generic	note,	the	tool	usability	is	also	pleasant	and	in	line	with	other	Microsoft	
tools.	Unfortunately,	the	file	format	on	Threat	Modelling	Tool	2014	is	completely	
new,	and	moving	the	model	to	other	tools	might	be	a	barrier	in	certain	cases	due	to	
the	different	Office	tool	versions.	(SDL	Team,	2014).	
Vision 
Diagram 
Validate 
Mitigate 
Identify	
threats 
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The	modelling	style	is	aligned	with	other	Microsoft	tools	like	Visio	and	the	model	
uses	graphical	Data	Flow	Diagrams	that	have	a	standard	set	of	symbols.	The	symbols	
contain	data	flows,	data	stores,	processes	and	interactors.	(SDL	Team,	2014).	
	
Advantages	of	the	tool	are	listed	below	as	follows:	
• Simple	(Shostack,	2010)	
• Standard	set	of	symbols	(SDL	Team,	2014).	
• Supports	STRIDE	with	guided	analysis	and	mitigations	(Shostack,	2010)	
• Bug	tracking	tools	integration	support	(SDL	Team,	2014).	
• Office	tools	support	(also	Visio)	(Shostack,	2010)	
	
Disadvantages	of	the	tool	are	presented	as	follows:	
• The	tool	runs	only	on	Windows	platform	(SDL	Team,	2014).	
• Certain	stencils	are	for	Windows	based	systems	only	(The	author)	
	
3.5 STRIDE	
Acronym	STRIDE	is	stands	for	the	words	spoofing,	tampering,	repudiation,	infor-
mation	disclosure,	denial	of	service	and	elevation	of	privilege	(Shostack,	2014,	61).	
The	threat	model	was	invented	and	produced	by	Loren	Kohnfelder	and	Praerit	Garg	
in	1999	in	Microsoft,	and	the	first	entry	was	on	MSDN	Blogs	on	the	first	of	April	1999	
(Shostack,	2014,	61).	According	to	Kohnfelder	and	Garg	(1999,	1),	Microsoft	should	
use	STRIDE	to	identify	threats	during	the	design	phase.	In	principle	each	word	works	
as	an	umbrella	for	number	of	the	similar	style	of	threats.	For	instance	spoofing	is	
possible	for	the	IP	or	MAC	addresses	on	the	networks	but	as	well	for	a	fake	user	pro-
file	that	was	created	in	deceptive	purposes.	The	primary	purpose	of	the	STRIDE	is	to	
recognize	the	possible	threats	and	gather	the	possible	attacks	or	threats.	The	catego-
rization	is	secondary	issue	and	often	users	have	to	select	one	of	multiple	choices	and	
do	not	worry	about	the	right	category	(Shostack,	2014,	64).	
	
Despite	the	STRIDE	being	a	lightweight	threat	model,	the	usage	requires	a	vast	
amount	of	work.	(Shostack,	2014,	64).	The	easy	to	understand	approaches	are	more	
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useful	for	beginners;	however,	after	gaining	experience	more	demanding	models	
may	be	more	useful.	(Shostack,	2014,	409-411).		The	threat	prevention	is	based	on	
investigation	of	the	right	defences	for	the	possible	attacks	on	the	target	system.	
	
STRIDE	is	planned	to	prevent	the	threats;	however,	the	vulnerabilities	and	the	man-
agement	of	the	vulnerabilities	coverage	are	not	throughout	covered	(Shostack,	2014,	
221).	The	other	variants	are	STRIDE-per-Element	and	STRIDE-per-Interaction.	(Shos-
tack,	2014,	80).		The	variants	work	with	the	same	ideology;	however,	they	do	require	
a	deeper	understanding	of	the	STRIDE	to	get	the	best	results.	(Shostack,	2014,	61-
62).	
	
	
Table	4.	STRIDE	threats	and	violations	(adapted	from	Shostack,	2014,	62)	
Threat	 Property	violation	
Spoofing	 Authentication	
Tampering	 Integrity	
Repudiation	 Non-repudiation	
Information	disclosure	 Confidentiality	
Denial	of	service	 Availability	
Elevation	of	privilege	 Authorization	
	
	
3.5.1 STRIDE	usage	
STRIDE	as	a	model	fits	to	the	many	different	development	models	and	processes	and	
it	is	possible	to	apply	to	all	kinds	of	development	models.	One	approach	is	to	use	the	
whiteboard	and	draw	everything	with	the	team.	An	official	possibility	is	to	use	Mi-
crosoft’s	Threat	Modelling	Tool	and	draw	the	system’s	interfaces	and	components	as	
a	diagram.	Applying	the	STRIDE	to	the	diagram	can	be	done	in	a	formal	way	with	de-
sign	work;	however;	the	problem	with	the	tool	usage	causes	often	less	collaboration	
and	the	one	person	perspective	is	taken	into	account.	It	can	also	be	a	tedious	task	
and	often	only	security	experts	participate	in	review	meetings.	The	second	and	more	
entertaining	possibility	is	to	use	Elevation	of	Privilege	game.	The	game	is	created	
		31	
based	on	Protection	Poker	by	Laurie	Williams,	NCSU	and	it	is	promised	to	offer	an	
easy	way	for	developers	to	enter	to	the	world	of	threat	models’.	The	game	requires	
the	diagram	of	the	system	with	its	interfaces	or	the	selected	part	of	the	system.	Dur-
ing	the	game	the	threats	in	the	cards	are	connected	to	the	diagram	under	investiga-
tion.	In	the	end	the	points	are	counted,	a	winner	is	declared	and	all	found	threats	will	
be	reported	as	bugs.	(Shostack,	2010).	
	
3.5.2 Spoofing		
Spoofing	stands	for	masquerading	the	target	to	something	else	by	tampering	the	
target	or	the	data.	Examples	of	spoofing	targets	are	processes,	computers	or	per-
sons.		
	
Spoofing	can	be	done	for	instance	for	the	process,	the	file,	the	computer	or	the	per-
son.	For	instance,	computer	spoofing	is	possible	to	apply	for	ARP,	IP	or	DNS	services.	
The	person	spoofing	has	as	well	different	possibilities	like	spoofing	the	name	on	the	
email	or	hijacking	the	user	account.	(Shostack,	2014,	64	-	66).	
	
3.5.3 Tampering		
“Tampering	is	modifying	something,	typically	on	disk,	on	a	network,	or	in	memory”.	
(Shostack,	2014,	67).	Tampering	on	the	computer	includes	modifying	any	file	on	the	
disk	or	memory.	Tampering	on	the	network	includes	adding,	modifying	or	removing	
the	packets.	(Shostack,	2014,	67).	
	
3.5.4 Repudiation		
“Repudiation	is	claiming	you	didn’t	do	something,	or	were	not	responsible	for	what	
happened”.	(Shostack,	2014,	68).	The	repudiation	can	happen	due	to	accident	or	due	
to	purpose.	Repudiation	may	be	very	difficult	to	prove	if	the	logs	are	missing,	not	
available	or	made	unreadable	by	any	reason.	(Shostack,	2014,	68-69).	
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3.5.5 Information	disclosure	
“Information	disclosure	is	about	allowing	people	to	see	information	they	are	not	au-
thorized	to	see”.	(Shostack,	2014,	70).	Information	disclosure	can	happen	against	a	
process,	data	stores	or	data	flow.	(Shostack,	2014,	70-71).	
	
3.5.6 Denial	of	Service	
Denial	of	service	stands	for	consuming	all	resources	and	therefore	preventing	usage	
of	a	provided	service	by	malicious	means.	The	denial	of	service	can	be	done	against	
process,	data	store	or	data	flow	(Shostack,	2014,	72).	
	
3.5.7 Elevation	of	privilege	
Elevation	of	privilege	stands	for	allowing	the	attacker	to	do	something	that	is	author-
ized	for	higher	level	user	accounts.	For	instance,	the	elevation	of	privilege	can	be	
done	with	corrupting	the	process,	passing	the	authorization	with	missing	authoriza-
tion	checks	or	with	data	tampering.	(Shostack,	2014,	73).	
	
3.5.8 Exit	criteria	
There	are	two	different	exit	criteria	for	the	normal	STRIDE	variant.	Easiest	is	to	have	
one	threat	per	threat	type.	Second	and	more	comprehensive	possibility	is	to	have	
diagram	that	has	one	threat	per	element.	The	STRIDE	variant	STRIDE-per-element	
has	most	comprehensive	exit	criteria	and	it	stands	for	one	threat	per	check.	(Shos-
tack,	2014,	85).	
	
3.6 DESIST	
DESIST	is	very	similar	with	STRIDE,	however,	the	repudiation	is	replaced	with	dispute,	
and	denial	of	service	is	simply	service	denial.	An	acronym	is	built	of	Dispute,	Eleva-
tion	of	privilege,	Spoofing,	Information	Disclosure,	Service	Denial	and	Tampering.	
(Shostack	2014,	85).	Unfortunately	only	one	reference	was	found	concerning	DESIST	
and	therefore	it	cannot	be	described	in	more	deeper	manner.	
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3.7 P.A.S.T.A	(Process	for	Attack	Simulation	and	Threat	Analysis)	
The	security	area	evolves	all	the	time	and	PASTA	is	attempt	to	answer	for	new	so-
phisticated	cyber	threats	with	its	integration	to	the	companies’	existing	security	en-
gineering,	risk	management,	incident	response	and	vulnerability	management	pro-
cesses.	The	process	should	especially	help	to	develop	systems	with	resilience	to	the	
targeted	attacks	on	web	sites	and	services,	e.g.	distributed	denial	of	service	attacks	
or	malware	attacks.	(Morana,	2014,	2).	
	
Regarding	to	Morana	(2014),	the	main	goals	of	the	PASTA	process	are	improving	visi-
bility	of	cyber	threat	risks,	extending	the	organization	protection	domains,	leveraging	
existing	application	security	processes,	integrating	with	the	SLDC	and	increasing	the	
maturity.	The	mentioned	benefits	are	risk	reduction,	knowledge	of	the	threats,	resili-
ence,	software	security	and	collaboration	among	stakeholders.	The	stakeholders	are	
developers,	security	or	pen-testers,	project	managers,	architects,	CISO’s	and	business	
managers.	(Morana,	2014,	4).		
	
The	model	has	seven	different	stages	and	each	stage	steps	are	enumerated	with	pre-
fix	of	the	stage.	In	first	stage	all	business	objectives,	security	or	compliance	objec-
tives,	impact	and	the	risk	profile	are	handled	in	appropriate	manner.	The	second	
stage	concentrates	on	software,	counterparts,	services,	infrastructure	and	the	tech-
nical	scope	completeness.	The	third	stage	handles	use	cases	and	risk	functions,	doc-
ument	data	flow	diagrams	(DFDs)	and	functional	and	architectural	decomposition	
analysis.	The	fourth	stage	is	the	threat	analysis	part	including	scenarios,	threat	in-
formation,	threat	libraries,	threat	agents	and	the	probability	of	the	threats.	The	fifth	
stage	is	reviewing	and	identifying	the	weaknesses	and	vulnerabilities.	The	sixth	stage	
is	attack	strategy,	attack	modelling,	testing	and	simulation.	The	seventh	and	final	
stage	is	risk	calculation,	countermeasures	identification,	risk	mitigation,	residual	risk	
calculation	and	recommended	strategies	for	risk	mitigation.	(Morana,	2014).	The	
following	figure	illustrates	PASTA's	main	stages	and	the	stage	contents.	
		34	
	
Figure	6.	Stages	of	P.A.S.T.A	(Morana,	2014)	
	
3.8 TARA	–	Threat	Agent	Risk	Assessment	
Intel	published	their	own	risk	assessment	methodology	in	2009	and	it	is	an	obvious	
choice	when	strong	support	for	decision	making	is	needed.	Intel’s	TARA	offers	a	
comprehensive	way	to	prioritize	and	separate	important	security	risks	from	unim-
portant	security	risks	and	to	produce	situation	awareness	of	risks	for	the	system.	
TARA	is	used	to	plan	and	predict	security	risks	in	the	early	phase.	The	risk	analysis	is	
expected	to	produce	accurate	information	about	risks,	and	the	model	is	planned	to	
act	as	a	supportive	element	for	decision	making	in	critical	systems.	The	model	con-
tains	also	the	possibility	to	validate	the	accuracy	of	predictions.		An	interesting	view-
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point	on	the	model	is	that	it	is	expected	to	adapt	to	continuously	changing	risks	that	
is	definitely	benefit	on	risk	modelling.	(Rosenquist,	2009,	1)	
	
	
Figure	7.	Identifying	most	important	risks	and	threat	agents	(Rosenquist,	2009,	4)	
	
There	are	three	threat	agent	libraries:	Threat	agent	library	(TAL),	Common	exposure	
library	(CEL)	and	Methods	and	objectives	library	(MOL).	The	threat	agent	library	in-
cludes	8	common	threat	agent	attributes	and	22	archetypes.	(Rosenquist,	2009,	4).	
These	attributes	are	visibility,	objectivity,	skills,	resources,	limits,	outcome	and	ac-
cess.	Each	attribute	contains	several	intentions.	The	archetypes	are	people	types	
such	as	employees	or	spies.	Common	exposure	library	enumerates	known	infor-
mation	security	vulnerabilities	and	exposures,	and	basically	users	should	rely	on	pub-
licly	available	CELs	and	add	their	own	content.	Methods	and	objectives	library	con-
tains	threat	agent	objectives.	(Casey,	2007,	1	-	5).	
		
As	an	interesting	finding	TARA	seems	to	fit	for	health	care	risk	evaluation	to	maxim-
ize	security	budgets	based	on	a	practical	article	“Improving	Healthcare	Risk	Assess-
ments	to	Maximize	Security	Budgets”	(Houding,	Casey,	Rosenquist.	2012).	
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3.9 TRIKE	
TRIKE	is	an	attempt	to	create	the	methodology	and	the	tool	from	the	risk	manage-
ment	perspective	in	a	way	that	removes	need	of	repetitive	work.	The	model	is	re-
leased	on	open	source	community’s	principles	with	MIT	license	(Larcom,	Saitta,	
2012).	TRIKE	uses	its	own	methodology	that	is	defined	by	the	team	of	security	pro-
fessionals	(Velez	&	Morana	2015,	171).	Basically,	the	model	is	originated	from	two	
STRIDE	derivate	threat	models	that	caused	frustration	in	practice	due	to	repetitive	
tasks.	Since	the	existing	models	like	STRIDE	did	not	take	repetition	into	account	the	
new	threat	model	development	called	TRIKE	was	started	2003	(Larcom	2012).		
	
The	model’s	approach	is	threat	modelling	and	system	auditing	with	the	high	automa-
tion	level.	The	model	leans	heavily	on	communication	between	security	teams	and	
stakeholders	in	way	to	protect	the	assets	on	reasonable	level.	Informing	of	the	ac-
tions	is	essential	and	making	sure	that	the	each	stakeholder	understands	the	risks	
and	can	mitigate	the	risks.	The	system	stakeholders	investigate	risks	to	the	assets	
and	mitigate	the	risks	or	accept	the	risks.	(Saitta,	Larcom,	Eddington,	M	2005.	1	-	3).		
	
According	to	Velez	and	Morana,	TRIKE	is	risk	or	asset	based	threat	modelling	ap-
proach.	The	model	includes	many	phases	like	asset	identification	on	the	application	
environment,	privileges	and	the	communication	channels	that	are	found	from	other	
threat	models.	(Velez	&	Morana	2015,	171)	
	
The	TRIKE	methodology	has	versions	1,	1.5	and	2.	The	white	paper	of	Version	1	is	on	
DRAFT	status,	version	1.5	is	partially	documented	and	version	2	is	under	active	de-
velopment.	The	last	update	regarding	to	the	page	news	is	from	31th	July	2012	
(Larcom	&	Saitta,	2012).	According	to	(Larcom	2012),	the	TRIKE	team	do	not	have	
time	to	update	the	website.	
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Table	5.	TRIKE	versions	and	tools	(Larcom	2012)	
Version	and	the	supported	tool	 Description	
Trike	v1:	Squeak	 • Threats	are	automatically	gener-
ated	based	on	the	intended	ac-
tions.	
• Threats	prioritization	supported.	
• No	import	or	export	supported.	
• Includes	attack	tree	stubs	(depre-
cated).	
	
Trike	v1.5:	The	spreadsheet	 • Excel	based	spreadsheets.	
• Threats	are	automatically	gener-
ated	based	on	the	intended	ac-
tions.	
• Threats	prioritization	supported.	
• Security	objectives	supported.		
• The	data	collection	supported	
without	analysis.	
• Basic	support	for	HAZOP	analysis.		
Trike	v2:	The	Squeak	(not	published,	the	
future	version)	
• Redesigned	version	
• Implements	version	v2	
• Interface	expected	highlight	the	
problems	and	the	missing	infor-
mation	
• REST	interface	
	
	
Microsoft’s	threat	modelling	uses	STRIDE	for	threat	modelling	(SDL	Threat	Modelling	
Tool,	2015)	but	Trike	tries	to	automate	repetitive	actions	using	separate	threat,	risk	
and	implementation	model	that	are	based	on	Squeak	tool	or	the	Excel	spreadsheets.	
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TRIKE	emphasizes	the	high	automation	level,	defensive	perspective	and	the	good	
enough	security	level.	(Saitta,	Larcom	&	Eddington	2005,	1	-	3).	
	
Table	6.	TRIKE	phases	(Saitta,	Larcom	&	Eddington	2005.	3	-	14)	
TRIKE	phases	 Description	
Requirements	model	 Assets,	actors,	intended	actions	and	
rules.	Actor-Asset-Action	matrix.	
Implementation	model	(DFD’s)	 Data	flows,	the	actions	that	can	be	per-
formed	in	real	time	+	system	state.	
Threat	model	 Implementation	model	analyzation	and	
creation	of	the	threat	model	based	on	
that.	
	
- Enumerate	threats	
- Risk	values	
- Attack	graphs	
- Mitigating	controls	assigned	to	
the	vulnerabilities	
Risk	model	 Based	on	assets,	roles,	actions	and	
threat	exposure.	
	
3.10 TRIKE	Usage	
Usage	of	the	TRIKE	is	allowed	based	on	the	MIT	License	(MIT)	and	therefore	it	is	pos-
sible	to	take	the	model	and	update	it	according	to	the	organizations’	needs.	(Saitta,	
Larcom	&	Eddington	2005,	1).		
	
3.10.1 Requirements	model	
Use	of	the	TRIKE	starts	with	listing	expected	and	unexpected	users	or	user	groups	
and	assets.	Simultaneously	system	or	actually	the	functionality	that	system	imple-
ments	and	the	actions	taken	by	human	beings	towards	system	functionality	are	
listed.	Asset	stands	for	something	that	has	monetary	value,	specific	and	tangible	
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pieces	of	data	like	system	itself	or	the	configuration	file	but	not	artefacts	like	pass-
words	(Saitta,	Larcom	&	Eddington	2005,	3-5).	An	asset	can	be	a	physical	object	if	it	is	
featured	in	the	business	rules	of	the	system	(Saitta,	Larcom	&	Eddington	2005,	16).	
Human	being	is	a	self-explanatory	term,	however,	in	TRIKE	it	means	an	actor	and	in	
some	rare	cases	other	than	human	beings	may	take	or	cause	actions	and	are	there-
fore	taken	into	account.	Intended	actions	are	something	that	users	take	towards	the	
system.	Actors,	assets,	intended	actions	and	the	rules	are	applied	to	the	“Actor-
Asset-Action	matrix”	to	specify	users,	functionality	and	taken	actions.	Additionally,	
actions	are	defined	by	positive	or	negative	rules	that	define	circumstances	surround-
ing	the	action.	(Saitta,	Larcom	&	Eddington	2005,	3-5).		
	
The	action	control	matrix	or	Actor-Asset-Action	matrix	uses	database	language	and	
the	TRIKE’s	V1	tool	Squak	displays	matrix	that	uses	the	abbreviation	CRUD	(Larcom	
2012).	Basically	it	is	a	visual	representation	of	requirements	that	eventually	derivate	
threats	as	a	result	in	automatic	way.	The	abbreviation	CRUD	comes	from	the	data-
base	vocabulary	and	stands	for	create,	read,	update	and	delete.	The	first	square	on	
left	top	corner	is	“C”,	the	second	square	is	“R”,	the	third	square	on	second	row	is	“U”	
and	the	last	square	is	“D”.	Each	square	has	color	based	values	“Always”,	“Some-
times”,	“Never”	and	“Unknown”.	The	asset	names	are	listed	on	the	top	of	the	col-
umns	and	the	actors	are	listed	on	the	left	side	of	the	rows.	(Saitta,	Larcom,	&	Edding-
ton	2005,	3-5).		
	
	
		40	
	
Figure	8.	Squeak!	The	standalone	tool	for	TRIKE	V1	(Larcom	&	Saitta	2012,	Tools).	
	
3.10.2 Implementation	model	
The	implementation	model	forms	data	flow	diagrams	of	hardware	and	software	
components.	The	intended	actions,	supporting	operations	and	the	state	machine	are	
keywords	for	this	model.	Before	implementation	model	the	requirements	model	is	
finished	and	the	intended	functionality	is	fully	understood.		
	
The	model	creation	starts	with	searching	the	actions	that	are	against	or	do	not	apply	
into	intended	actions.	Actions	are	reflected	to	the	system	states	in	the	system	with	
the	data	flow	diagram.	(Saitta,	Larcom	&	Eddington	2005,	3-5).			
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Table	7.	TRIKE	implementation	steps	
Implementation	steps	 Description	
List	state	style	requirements	in	the	rules		
for	intended	actions.	Include	state	tag	
within	identifier	and	type	of	the	object	
(asset	in	the	system,	an	actor	(human	
being),	specific	role	of	the	actor).	
	
Example:	Message	in	the	inbox	could	be	
asset	“Email”	or	“Email	account	owner	
logged	in	the	mail	system”.	In	this	case	
tag	could	be	“user”	
Create	the	data	flow	diagrams	(DFD)		 Standard	diagram	type.	Includes	pro-
cesses,	data	storing,	external	counter-
parts	(interactors)	and	data	flow	be-
tween	everything.	
Create	use	flows	(Experimental	feature	
on	Trike	V1)	
Use	flow	stands	for	combining	the	state	
requirements	to	the	data	flow	diagrams	
as	a	use	flow	diagrams.	Basically	all	ac-
tions	in	the	system	are	mapped	to	the	
DFD’s.	
	
3.10.3 Threat	Model	
The	threat	model	includes	threat	generation,	attacks,	attack	Trees	(deprecated	after	
first	TRIKE	V1)	and	the	attack	graph,	weaknesses,	vulnerabilities,	mitigations	and	at-
tack	libraries.	The	full	threat	model	requires	the	requirements	and	the	implementa-
tion	finished.	The	first	phase	is	the	attack	graph	creation	and	after	that	examination	
of	the	weaknesses	in	the	system.	The	attack	graph	generation	was	intended	to	be	
automatic.	The	last	part	investigates	vulnerabilities	and	figures	out	mitigations	for	
the	vulnerabilities.	
	
Trike	V1	supports	two	separate	threats	and	they	are	elevation	of	privilege	and	denial	
of	service.	The	elevation	of	privilege	has	three	different	subcategories:	the	first	takes	
place	when	the	actor	is	able	to	perform	any	action	towards	system	that	should	not	
be	possible	for	the	actor.	The	second	occurs	if	the	actor	performs	action	that	is	not	
allowed.	The	third	happens	if	actor	uses	the	system	to	perform	the	action	on	some	
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other	system’s	asset.	In	TRIKE	any	spoofing	or	any	tampering	are	considered	as	ele-
vation	of	privilege	threats.	Denial	of	service	stands	for	any	prevention	from	any	in-
tended	action	that	is	described	with	rules	as	system’s	actions.	Threat	generation	has	
only	few	rules.	Each	intended	action	will	have	one	denial	of	service	threat.	The	eleva-
tion	of	privilege	threats	is	generated	with	inversion	of	the	intended	actions.	These	
particular	negative	actions	are	selected	to	generate	disallowed	actions	that	are	not	
following	the	rules.	The	last	one	is	the	social	responsibility	threat	that	stands	for	us-
ing	the	system	to	take	the	action	against	other	system.		(Saitta,	Larcom	&	Eddington	
2005,	8-9).	
	
The	attacks	can	be	based	on	threat,	implementation	or	technology	specific	steps.	In	
TRIKE	V1	attacks	were	organized	in	attack	trees;	however,	the	method	is	deprecated	
in	later	versions.	The	attacks	are	replenished	with	weaknesses,	vulnerabilities,	miti-
gations	and	attack	libraries.	
	
3.10.4 Risk	model	
The	TRIKE’s	risk	model	is	on	experimental	level	despite	of	fact	that	is	core	feature	of	
the	TRIKE	methodology.	Basically,	the	risk	model	helps	targeting	resources	to	the	
right	areas	with	help	of	the	attack	graph.	(Saitta,	Larcom	&	Eddington	2005,	8-9).		
	
	
3.11 Attack	libraries	
The	attack	library	is	a	collection	of	attacks	for	some	specific	purpose,	and	its	contents	
depend	on	users,	detail	versus	abstraction	and	scope.	The	structure	can	be	light-
weight	or	highly	organized.	The	library	scope	defines	the	area	where	a	library	is	ap-
plicable.	At	the	time	of	writing	the	thesis	the	number	of	publicly	available	attack	li-
braries	is	small	because	the	development	of	the	library	consumes	a	vast	amount	of	
time	and	resources.		The	important	difference	between	an	attack	library	and	a	check-
list	is	the	threat	modeling.	The	attack	library	usage	always	requires	practical	threat	
modeling,	however,	the	checklist	does	not.	(Shostack	2014,	101-102).		
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3.11.1 CAPEC	
CAPEC	is	a	registered	trademark	and	an	attack	library	within	classification	taxonomy	
of	known	attacks	maintained	by	MITRE	Corporation	from	USA.	Interesting	viewpoints	
are	that	the	CAPEC	is	sponsored	by	U.S.	Department	of	Homeland	Security	and	the	
library	is	under	active	maintenance	(Mitre,	2014).	According	to	(Shostack	2014,	106),	
the	CAPEC	can	give	more	results	regarding	to	attacks	than	STRIDE’s	security	proper-
ties	but	the	CAPEC	techniques	are	far	more	complex.	In	Velez	&	Morana’s	views	
(2015,	462-463)	the	library	is	one	of	the	best	and	truly	comprehensive	attack	library	
available.	Mitre’s	records	shows	that	the	library	contains	currently	over	460	attack	
patterns	that	are	available	within	different	methods	like	Google	based	search	or	
CAPEC	ID	search.	
	
The	CAPEC	offers	a	possibility	to	get	the	CAPEC	library	in	XML	format.	The	XML	li-
brary	can	be	used	for	various	purposes	but	the	parsing	of	the	must	be	done	locally.	
Basically	it	offers	possibility	to	combine	the	CAPEC	data	to	the	tailored	systems	and	
methods	and	therefore	it	can	save	great	deal	of	time	because	the	attack	library	is	
ready	for	usage.	However;	aggregating	of	the	CAPEC	XML	data	within	other	typical	
attack	libraries	like	OWASP,	WASC	or	PTES	is	possible	but	it	consumes	definitely	a	lot	
of	time.	(Velez	&	Morana,	2015,	462).	
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Figure	9.	CAPEC	VIEW:	Domains	of	Attack	(Mitre	2015).	
	
3.11.2 OWASP	
OWASP	is	an	abbreviation	for	The	Open	Web	Application	Security	Project.	The	pro-
ject	aims	at	continuously	improving	software	security	worldwide,	especially	web	ap-
plications;	however,	it	is	possible	to	apply	the	project	methodology	is	possible	to	any	
software	project	since	the	project	consists	of	dozens	of	separate	security	projects.	
One	example	is	the	Cheat	Sheet	Series	project	that	contains	numerous	cheat	sheets	
for	attacking	and	prevention.	The	OWASP	project’s	most	commonly	known	security	
related	guidance	list	is	OWASP	Top-10	that	contains	10	most	commonly	exploited	
security	flaws	in	the	web	applications.	In	layman’s	terms	the	Top-10	project	clarifies	
and	makes	security	issues	visible	for	individuals	and	organizations.	The	OWASP	pro-
ject	focus	is	worldwide,	and	eventually	security	based	decision	making	is	easier	
based	on	different	projects	data	like	OWASP	TOP-10	threats	list,	cheat	sheet	series	or	
the	security	testing	guide.	(Shostack	2014,	108;	OWASP	2015,	Main	page).	
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The	drawback	of	OWASP	project	is	that	OWASP	cannot	work	as	the	only	security	
source	since	the	project	data	does	not	fulfil	scientific	requirements.	The	project	is	the	
result	of	thousands	of	volunteer	users’	commits.	The	project	does	not	have	specific	
requirements	for	the	participants,	and	thus	the	project	data	cannot	be	considered	to	
be	scientific.	(OWASP	2015,	Main	page).		
	
According	to	Shostack,	the	OWASP	TOP-10	can	replenish	STRIDE	threat	model	usage	
(Shostack	2014,	108).	Additionally,	OWASP	recommends	Microsoft’s	threat	model-
ling	process	for	the	web	applications	and	informs	that	everyone	in	the	software	de-
velopment	team	can	easily	apply	the	Microsoft’s	threat	modelling	process.	(OWASP	
2015,	Risk	Threat	modelling).	
	
3.11.3 WASC	Threat	Classification	
The	WASC	Threat	Classification	is	the	attack	library	by	Web	Application	Security	Con-
sortium.	The	latest	version	is	v2.0	and	its	release	year	was	2010.	The	library	contains	
threats	in	grid	view	or	tree	view.	The	vulnerabilities	are	categorized	under	design,	
implementation	or	deployment.		(WASC,	2010).	
	
	
4 Theory	research	of	own	threat	model	
This	part	of	the	document	describes	the	collected	theory	and	background	for	own	
model	before	implementation	phase.	Theory	is	a	basis	for	deeper	ideation	and	even-
tually	implementation	of	own	threat	model.	Several	different	approaches	are	han-
dled	through	behavior,	crimes,	attacks	and	threats	are	described.	
	
4.1 Behaviour	analysis	
According	to	the	author,	nearly	all	of	existing	risk	and	threat	models	concentrate	on	
software	specific	threats,	however,	it	always	needs	to	be	remembered	that	people	
use	the	software,	systems	and	computers.	Jackson	(2012,	99)	describes	behaviour	
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analysis	as	follows:		“The	key	to	behaviour	analysis	is	to	simply	identify	antecedents,	
behaviours,	and	consequences	in	a	non-biased	manner,	although	it	can	be	difficult”.	
Therefore,	the	most	important	model	to	recognize	would	be	behaviour	based	analy-
sis	model	and	according	to	the	author,	it	should	be	applied	to	the	agile	development	
models.	In	this	thesis	a	deep	delve	into	the	psychology	area	is	not	possible	but	some	
noticed	basic	tenets	are	discussed.		
	
4.2 Operant	Conditioning	
Operant	conditioning	can	be	considered	as	part	of	operant	psychology.	As	a	theory	it	
consists	of	reinforcement	and	punishment	and	both	can	be	positive	or	negative.	Re-
inforcement	simply	means	increasing	the	rate	of	response	and	punishment	means	
decreasing	the	rate	of	response.	In	this	model	reinforcements	and	punishments	must	
follow	behaviour;	however,	their	purpose	is	to	cause	different	results.	(McSweeney	
&	Murphy	2006,	167-169).	
	
Positive	reinforcement	can	be	considered	as	a	reward	and	negative	reinforcement	as	
an	avoidance	or	escape.	Both	reinforcements	do	increase	the	probability	the	fre-
quency	of	the	preceding	behaviour.	For	instance,	if	a	user	commits	to	do	something	
towards	better	security	s/he	may	get	bonus	or	positive	attention	and	therefore	gain	
positive	reinforcement.	Regarding	to	negative	reinforcement	user	may	want	to	wear	
security	badge	to	avoid	a	warning.	(McSweeney	&	Murphy	2006,	171).	
	
Positive	punishment	decreases	the	probability	of	the	preceding	behaviour.	For	in-
stance,	if	a	user	decides	to	install	illegal	software	to	his	workstation,	s/he	gets	caught	
due	to	workstation	software	audit	and	receives	a	warning	of	acting	against	company	
policy.		In	consequence	of	that	it	is	less	likely	that	a	user	installs	the	illegal	software	
again.	Therefore	security	policies	and	their	enforcement	in	this	case	work	as	positive	
punishment.	(McSweeney	&	Murphy	2006,	172).	
	
Negative	punishment	decreases	the	probability	of	the	behaviour	with	removing	
something	due	to	the	user’s	actions.		For	instance,	a	user	might	want	to	login	with	
another	user’s	credentials	with	trying	to	guess	his	/	her	password.	After	few	attempts	
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account	or	even	workstation	is	locked	for	30	minutes	and	in	order	to	continue	right	
away	the	user	must	call	the	service	desk	or	ask	the	administrator	to	reopen	the	
locked	account.	(McSweeney	&	Murphy	2006,	172).	
	
4.3 Applied	Behaviour	Analysis	(ABA)	
Applied	behaviour	analysis	is	a	methodology	originating	from	B.F.	Skinner’s	behav-
ioural	principles	derived	from	basic	laboratory	research,	and	the	first	announcement	
of	the	ABA	methodology	was	made	1968	in	the	Journal	of	Applied	Behaviour	Analysis	
(JABA).	(Carr,	2000,	295).	However,	there	are	some	remarks	that	ABA	has	been	
around	much	longer.	(Kearney	2007,	19).	Understanding	science	models	of	psycholo-
gy	might	reveal	ways	to	prevent	risks	and	threats	much	before	they	are	realized.	
Models	can	be	used	beforehand	to	prevent	something	such	as	crimes	or	afterwards	
to	figure	out	why	the	crime	happened.	Thus,	in	crime	investigation	behaviour	analy-
sis	has	been	a	part	of	crime	investigation	since	1932;	however,	science	has	improved	
it	all	the	time.	(Douglas,	Burgess,	Burgess	&	Ressler	2006,	4).	Despite	of	science	
achievements,	the	basic	applied	behaviour	analysis	is	still	applicable	and	fully	valid	
for	relatively	new	areas	like	cyber	security.	(Jackson	2012,	4).	
	
“ABA	is	an	approach	to	changing	socially	useful	behaviours	that	employs	scientifically	
established	principles	of	learning	to	bring	about	these	changes.”	The	model	is	often	
used	to	achieve	positive	changes	and	one	typical	instance	is	pedagogics.	(Kearney	
2007,	19).	Applying	ABA	with	malicious	behaviour	can	help	to	recognize	threats	be-
fore	they	occur.	Everyone	knows	that	each	person	reacts	in	his/her	own	personal	
way	in	different	situations	and	events.	Any	key	event	or	situation	can	affect	person’s	
the	self-image	and	how	persons	behave	in	the	future.	(Jackson	2012,	3).	Eventually	
ABA	is	a	part	of	operant	psychology	with	the	intention	to	help	individuals	and	groups,	
no	matter	whether	ABA	can	even	help	in	situations	when	the	threat	is	caused	unin-
tentionally.	(Jackson	2012,	117).	
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4.3.1 Antecedent	
Antecedents	are	“things	that	happen	or	are	already	in	place	before	the	target	behav-
iour	occurs”.	(Kearney	2007,	31).	According	to	Kearney,	many	of	antecedents	are	
basically	neutral	or	not	important	for	target	behaviour;	however,	certain	antecedents	
may	reinforce	or	diminish	behaviour.		
	
Cambridge	Advanced	Learner’s	Dictionary	describes	antecedent	as	follows:		“Some-
one	or	something	existing	or	happening	before,	especially	as	the	cause	or	origin	of	
something	existing	or	happening	later.”	(Cambridge	2008,	53).	According	to	Jackson,	
antecedents	consist	of	preceding	events	and	situations.	(Jackson	2012,	3).	
	
Based	on	previous	quotations,	antecedents	can	be	considered	as	a	result	of	certain	
meaningful	or	important	things	in	past	that	may	reinforce	or	diminish	certain	type	of	
behaviour.	
	
4.3.2 Behaviour	
Behaviour	definition	depends	on	context	but	basically	it	is	simply	one	or	a	series	of	
acts	or	conductions	towards	others.	(Kearney	2007,	23).	Another	notable	factor	is	the	
frequency	of	the	behaviour.	(Kearney	2007,	25).	For	instance,	in	a	company	network	
a	single	port	scan	or	minor	security	incident	might	not	be	dangerous;	however,	series	
of	them	require	further	actions	to	maintain	security.	
	
In	Jackson’s	view	(2012,	165),	specific	antecedents	with	followed	consequences	
change	behaviour	with	reinforcing	behaviour	or	decreasing	behaviour	based	on	fol-
lowing	consequences.	Hence,	the	same	or	similar	antecedents	with	favourable	con-
sequences	reinforce	behaviour	and	unfavourable	consequences	decrease	the	behav-
iour.	(Jackson	2012,	165).	Behaviour	is	often	a	result	of	three	combined	factors:	He-
redity	or	genetic	endowment,	physiological	changes	and	learning.	(Kearney	2007,	
25).	According	to	Jackson,	behaviour	has	always	certain	rules:	”The	world	would	be	
chaos	if	all	humans	responded	spontaneously	without	considering	such	antecedents	
as	culture,	laws,	rules,	convention,	and	patterns	of	past	behaviour”.	(Jackson	2012,	
169).	
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In	the	crime	investigation	related	studies	prove	that	any	behaviour	reflects	influence	
of	internal	and	external	factors.	These	factors	stand	for	psychological	motivations	
and	social	stresses.	As	cybercrimes	are	another	crime	class,	finding	the	motivations	
and	stresses	should	help	to	recognize	antecedents	and	behaviour	that	might	lead	to	
certain	consequences.	(Douglas,	A.W.	Burgess,	A.G.	Burgess	&	Ressler.	2006,	383-5).	
 
4.3.3 Consequences	
Consequences	are	simply	matters	that	take	place	after	a	specific	behaviour	occurs.	
Basically,	consequences	that	follow	the	behaviour	regularly	enough	change	the	fre-
quency	of	the	behaviour.	(Kearney	2007,	36).	Basically,	the	prediction	of	certain	be-
haviour	is	associated	with	antecedents	and	consequences	and	not	on	studying	the	
behaviour.	(Jackson	2012,	258).	
	
4.3.4 Antecedents,	Behaviour	and	consequences	behaviour	chain	
According	to	Jackson	(Jackson	2012,	4),	antecedents,	behaviour	and	consequences	
form	a	chain	applicable	for	predicting	malicious	behaviour	by	an	individual	or	group.	
The	model	is	based	on	behavioural	psychology	and	more	specifically	on	applied	be-
haviour	analysis	(ABA).	There	is	even	patented	automated	behavioural	assessment	
(AuBA)	technology	available;	however,	automated	area	is	not	covered	in	this	thesis.	
As	the	model	is	a	general	viewpoint	to	any	individual	or	group	behavioural	analyza-
tion,	it	helps	to	prevent	attacks	based	on	collected	data.	The	model	is	rooted	in	the	
past	in	a	special	program	at	Lincoln	State	School	in	Lincoln	where	a	researcher	(Gary	
M.	Jackson)	tried	to	resolve	the	developmentally	disabled	persons’	behaviour	prob-
lems	and	eventually	found	out	the	cure	for	their	behaviour	problems.	(Jackson	2012,	
472).	
	
According	to	Jackson,	news	articles	can	reveal	examples	from	the	past	that	help	to	
reveal	real	events	and	situations,	actions	and	consequences.	(Jackson	2012,	175-
176).	Hence,	cybercrimes	or	attacks	can	be	prevented	with	applying	the	usage	of	the	
behaviour	chain.	Searching	for	former	crimes,	violations,	events	or	situations	can	
help	to	find	ways	to	break	the	chain	before	the	unwanted	consequences	occur.	For	
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instance	the	health	care	news	archives	may	reveal	the	useful	data	that	can	be	used	
to	prevent	the	similar	crimes	in	future.	For	instance,	snooping	of	health	data	(access	
violation)	is	a	typical	crime	in	the	field	of	health	care	and	it	is	typically	carried	out	by	
health	care	professionals.	Antecedent	might	be	screaming	news	of	famous	person	on	
yellow	press,	and	behaviour	is	snooping	of	the	data	from	the	hospital	database.	Nat-
urally,	the	consequence	of	snooping	could	be	a	warning	for	employee	or	termination	
of	the	employment	whenever	a	person	is	caught	due	to	inspection	or	any	other	rea-
son.	Finding	the	key	environmental	influences	that	cause	a	definitive	behaviour	is	the	
key	to	finding	out	a	way	to	break	the	behaviour	chain.	
	
For	instance,	successful	snooping	attempt	might	reinforce	the	individuals	to	snoop	
data	again;	however,	getting	caught	for	snooping	works	in	the	opposite	way.	Based	
on	the	previous	overly	simplified	example	the	idea	is	to	break	the	behaviour	chain	at	
some	point.	In	this	case	changing	the	consequences	breaks	the	chain	and	thus	makes	
access	violation	to	data	less	favourable.	As	an	example,	detection	of	snooping	is	pos-
sible	with	logging	all	searches	that	an	employee	does	with	the	employee	id	and	even-
tually	officials	doing	inspections	searching	for	employees’	logins.	In	this	case,	the	
threat	to	get	caught	due	to	inspections	of	the	search	logs	acts	as	a	consequence	and	
when	an	employee	is	aware	of	the	threat	committing	the	crime	is	not	favourable.	
Breaking	the	chain	can	happen	as	well	in	the	antecedent	phase	and	the	employer	can	
carry	out	security	checks	and	specific	interviews	for	employee	to	make	sure	the	em-
ployee’s	background	is	clean	before	hiring	him/her	to	the	job.	Despite	the	yellow	
press	news	or	life	happenings,	the	honest	person	will	not	likely	commit	snooping	on	
another	person’s	health	data	on	the	database.	
	
	
Table	8.	ABC	Chain	elements	(adapted	from	Jackson	2012,	3)	
ABC	chain	element	 Description	
Antecedent	 Combination	of	events	and	situations	
from	past	that	directs	person’s	interests,	
choices	and	even	moral	perception.	
Behaviour	 Actions	made	by	individual.	
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Consequence	 Maintain,	increase	or	decrease	similar	
behaviour	in	future.	
	
	
4.4 Motivations	
Motivation	behind	a	crime	might	be	disgruntlement	due	to	a	certain	event	or	situa-
tion.	If	a	long	awaited	promotion	is	passed	over	to	someone	else	or	a	sudden	divorce	
is	due	to	cheating,	this	might	cause	different	kinds	of	motivations.	The	risk	for	cyber	
bullying,	unauthorized	data	violation	or	even	stalking	is	more	likely	to	occur	after	
certain	motivations.	(Jackson	2012,	212).	
	
According	to	Jackson	(2012,	47),	“Motivation	of	a	group	is	very	important	because	it	
tends	to	solidify	environmental	antecedents	for	terrorist	attacks”.	Terrorist	group	
motivation	is	a	good	example	of	the	deep	motivation	towards	selected	target.	There-
fore,	sometimes	it	is	more	important	to	understand	the	groups’	motivations	instead	
of	single	person’s	motivation.	
	
4.5 Modus	Operandi	
Perpetration	of	a	cybercrime	always	requires	actions,	and	modelling	of	the	actions	is	
needed	to	understand	how	the	crime	is	committed,	how	to	prevent	its	detection	and	
how	to	hide	the	tracks.	Because	cybercrimes	can	be	modelled	in	the	same	way	as	any	
other	crimes,	there	is	a	Latin	term	intended	to	describe	perpetrator	habits	in	specific	
cases.	Modus	Operandi	stands	for	“Method	of	operation”	and	for	anything	repeata-
ble	that	describes	someone’s	way	of	working	and	especially	when	speaking	about	
criminal	investigations.	The	criminal	might	have	some	simple	modus	operandi	in	the	
beginning	or	a	highly	evolved	version	depending	on	the	experience	and	resources.		
(Douglas,	A.W.	Burgess,	A.G.	Burgess	&	Ressler.	2006,	20).	
	
Most	people	want	to	evolve	their	way	of	working	and	eventually	learn	from	mis-
takes.	The	same	applies	to	cyber	criminals	since	they	make	mistakes	like	any	other	
people	and	they	try	to	get	better	with	time.	For	instance,	a	script	kiddie	might	carry	
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out	a	denial	of	service	attack	from	his	/	her	own	desktop	to	some	hobbyist	forums	to	
disrupt	them.	Disruption	stands	for	slowing	down	a	forum	user’s	access	to	the	fo-
rums.	However,	the	attacker	does	not	understand	right	away	that	a	forum’s	web-
server	has	logs	that	store	users’	IP	addresses	and	the	risk	of	getting	caught	is	higher	
than	expected.	Next	day	a	discussion	with	other	hacker	friends	reveals	that	there	are	
ways	to	scramble	where	the	attack	is	originated	and	next	week	he/she	will	attack	
with	a	distributed	denial	of	service	with	distributed	DNS	DDoS	attacks.	This	allows	
him/her	more	likelihood	to	commit	the	crime	without	getting	caught	by	the	police.	
DNS	DDoS	method	allowed	better	attack	power	and	thus	the	modus	operandi	
evolved	to	the	next	level.	(Douglas,	A.W.	Burgess,	A.G.	Burgess	&	Ressler.	2006,	20).	
	
4.6 Applying	behaviour	analysis	for	cyber	crimes	
Investigation	of	cybercrimes	has	been	a	part	of	crime	investigation	since	mid-1990s.	
(Douglas,	A.W.	Burgess,	A.G.	Burgess	&	Ressler.	2006,	407).	Eventually	applying	the	
behaviour	analysis	to	lone	cyber	attackers,	groups	and	even	to	country	level	threats	
may	help	to	prevent	attacks	or	crimes	before	they	do	happen.		It	is	paramount	to	
break	the	behavioural	chain	to	prevent	a	possible	attack	or	crime	beforehand.	On	the	
software	side	this	stands	for	thinking	about	the	possible	perpetrators	and	their	typi-
cal	behaviour	chains	(Jackson	2012,	175-176).	For	instance,	a	cyber-attacker	might	
have	experiences	from	past	that	attacking	some	website	was	fun	and	very	interest-
ing.		
	
A	typical	example	to	inspire	an	attacker	could	be	news	where	young	attackers	man-
aged	to	bring	down	Nordea’s	website	(Sky	news,	2014).		Due	to	this	inspiration,	the	
attacker	decides	to	plan	malicious	attacks	and	finds	out	other	hackers	from	the	In-
ternet.	These	hackers	start	to	collaborate	and	learn	hacking	by	doing.	Later	they	may	
decide	to	attack	some	specific	site.	The	group	does	reconnaissance	actions	and	may-
be	scans	the	website.	After	reconnaissance	is	done	the	attack	can	start.	In	the	begin-
ning	the	attacker	might	feel	fear	of	being	detected;	however,	s/he	may	notice	soon	
that	it	is	easy	to	carry	out	denial	of	service	attacks	and	not	get	caught.	Eventually	
s/he	advances	and	manages	to	exploit	some	existing	security	flaw	to	get	into	some-
one’s	personal	details	(Jackson	2012,	175-176);	Walker	2014,	49-50).		
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Figure	7.	Behaviour,	consequences	and	antecedent	chaining	(adapted	from	Jackson	
2012,	8)	
	
Ultimately,	the	prevention	of	attack	requires	cutting	the	behaviour	chain	in	some	
phase.	For	software	it	would	stand,	for	instance,	for	increasing	the	danger	of	getting	
caught	with	adding	Security	Information	and	Event	Management	system,	a	separate	
log	server,	warnings	to	website	for	criminal	liability	for	cyber	attacking	and	continu-
ous	follow-up	of	the	malicious	activities.	For	single	cyber	attackers	increasing	the	risk	
to	get	caught	(consequences)	might	be	enough	to	prevent	the	access	violation	or	
even	the	crime	(Jackson	2012,	8).	
	
4.7 Attacks	
Sun	Tzu	wrote	“All	warfare	is	based	on	deception”	(Giles,	1910,	3).	These	days	Russia	
performs	very	fuzzy	politics	in	Ukraine,	European	area	and	borders	of	USA.	Basically,	
all	this	behaviour	includes	deception,	propaganda	and	changing	mental	views.	Every-
thing	is	done	only	to	get	the	best	advantage	for	a	malicious	country	(Yle,	2015).	De-
ception	itself	applies	to	cybercrimes	as	well	as	espionage	or	cyber	theft.	Deception	is	
exceptionally	important	for	the	attacker	because	when	the	attack	is	easily	noticed	
then	the	risk	to	be	caught	rises.	Therefore,	the	attacker	may	be	very	deceptive	and	
use	for	instance	a	combination	of	exploits	and	social	engineering	to	achieve	targets.	
Basically,	a	crafted	and	quiet	attack	enables	an	attacker	to	achieve	the	target	without	
anyone	knowing	about	it.	(Jackson	2012,	18).			
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4.8 Attack	types	
According	to	Walker	(2014,	19),	there	are	four	different	attack	types	that	a	hacker	
can	use	and	these	apply	only	to	computer	software	and	networks.	The	following	ta-
ble	illustrates	four	different	attack	categories	and	descriptions	for	them.	(Walker	
2014,	19).	
	
Table	9.	Attack	types	According	to	EC-council	(Walker	2014,	19).	
Attack	type	 Description	
Operating	system	attacks	 Attacks	regarding	operating	systems	
without	latest	security	patches,	default	
security	settings,	weak	passwords	or	no	
password	at	all,	no	firewall,	forgotten	
user	accounts,	no	encryption	on	the	hard	
disk	and	so	on.	
Application-level	attacks	 All	logic	and	code	of	the	software.	Maybe	
the	easiest	place	to	find	vulnerabilities.	
Shrink-wrap	code	attacks	 Exploitation	of	available	automation	and	
installation	tools’	code	and	scripts.	
Misconfiguration	attacks	 Configuration	exploitation	with	inten-
tional	or	unintentional	misconfiguration.	
	
	
4.9 Hacking	
When	discussing	hacking	there	are	different	kinds	of	hackers	and	there	is	a	number	
of	different	categories	for	them.	In	networking	field	hacking	is	about	efforts	to	find	
ways	to	break,	prevent	access	or	steal	something.	One	publicly	known	categorization	
is	using	the	terms	white	hat,	black	hat	and	grey	hat	hackers.	White	hats	are	doing	
well	good	in	an	ethical	way	and	they	always	have	the	permission	from	the	customer	
for	hacking	their	systems.	Black	hats	have	also	another	name,	crackers	and	their	in-
tention	is	to	steal,	destroy	or	deny	access	to	systems	or	resources.	They	definitely	do	
not	have	a	permission	for	the	hacking.	Grey	hats	are	something	between	white	hats	
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and	black	hats.	Their	definition	is	more	or	less	neutral;	however,	often	they	turn	to	
the	black	side	due	to	the	lack	of	the	permission.	Some	grey	hats	are	just	curious	and	
hack	because	they	feel	that	it	is	good	for	everyone;	still	they	are	doing	it	without	
permission.	(Walker	2014,	18-19).	
	
4.10 Hacking	phases	
Recognizing	security	risks	and	threats	from	networks	needs	basic	understanding	of	
how	the	attacker	typically	may	work.	Certified	Ethical	Hacker	certification	contains	
ethical	EC	council’s	five-step	hacking	phases	that	is	the	basic	model	of	a	full	scale	
hacking	case.	It	is	important	to	notice	that	an	attacker	might	use	only	some	steps	and	
go	straight	forward	to	gaining	access	phase	after	getting	a	perfect	opportunity.	This	
model	should	help	to	recognize	risks	because	thinking	like	a	hacker	may	reveal	com-
pletely	new	viewpoints.	
	
Table	10.	Hacking	phases	According	to	EC-council	(adapted	from	Walker,	2014,	23).	
Hacking	phase	 Description	
Reconnaissance	 Most	important	phase	to	recognize	use-
ful	weak	points.	Collect	useful	infor-
mation	of	the	target	with	different	
methods	like	phishing,	search	engines,	
social	engineering	or	dumpster	diving.	
Can	be	stealthy	or	not	depending	on	the	
case.	
Scanning	and	Enumeration	 Deeper	technical	reconnaissance	based	
on	reconnaissance	phase.	Enumeration	
of	the	target	hosts.	
Gaining	Access	 Attacking	the	target(s)	based	on	scanning	
and	analysis	of	enumeration	results.	
Maintaining	Access	 Create	backdoors	so	access	is	perma-
nent.	
Covering	Tracks	 Hide	all	the	tracks	possible	so	that	no-
body	notices	the	successful	attack.	
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For	instance,	an	attacker	may	want	to	find	out	the	easiest	way	to	hospital’s	internal	
network	to	get	data	from	patient	registry.	The	most	favourable	access	would	be	a	
remote	connection	–	however,	that	is	easier	to	say	than	do.	In	reconnaissance	phase	
s/he	investigates	everything	about	the	hospital	from	the	Internet	and	collects	data	
fragments.	In	a	later	phase	a	visit	to	the	hospital	may	follow	with	some	excuse	a	visit	
to	see	a	doctor.	The	idea	of	the	visit	is	to	find	out	how	to	connect	a	laptop	to	their	
network	internally	–	after	trying	some	doors	the	attacker	finds	some	network	sockets	
that	seem	to	work.	Additionally,	s/he	searches	for	interesting	papers	from	trashes	
with	dumpster	diving.	On	some	other	day	he	might	call	the	hospital	and	ask	decep-
tive	questions	from	the	hospital’s	employees	using	social	engineering.	In	scanning	
and	enumeration	phase	a	laptop	is	simply	connected	to	hospital’s	network	because	
few	suitable	network	sockets	were	found	in	reconnaissance	phase	and	s/he	already	
knows	how	to	access	them.	Gaining	access	is	the	next	step	and	eventually	the	access	
is	achieved	from	hospital’s	network	because	it	is	much	easier	to	bypass	the	hospital’s	
firewall	that	way.	Maintaining	access	phase	succeeds	with	the	installation	of	back-
doors	to	old	Windows	XP	computers,	and	the	hospital’s	network	can	be	accessed	
from	remote	connection.	After	the	attack	is	completed	the	tracks	are	removed	with	
the	deletion	of	the	backdoors.		
	
4.11 Three	major	forms	of	attack	
Classification	of	the	attack	forms	might	be	an	endless	task	but	approaching	the	prob-
lem	with	three	major	forms	of	attacks	helps	to	classify	threats	on	a	general	level.	
Jackson	approaches	the	growing	damage	and	threat	with	these	three	forms	and	basi-
cally	they	seem	to	be	applicable	to	any	attack	type	classification	from	internal	/	ex-
ternal	point	of	view.	These	three	mentioned	forms	are	external	threat,	trusted	insid-
er	and	insider	without	intent.	(Jackson	2012,	117).	
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4.11.1 External	threat	
“The	external	threat	from	a	hacker	or	group	of	hackers	intent	on	causing	damage	or	
stealing	restricted	information”.	(Jackson	2012,	117).	
	
The	external	threat	is	probably	the	most	commonly	noticed	threat	on	the	news	and	it	
is	often	more	clear	how	to	prevent	the	external	threat.	For	example,	an	attacker	
could	bypass	a	weak	login	procedure	and	try	to	steal	personnel	data.		
	
4.11.2 Trusted	insider	
“The	trusted	insider	who	goes	bad	as	a	result	of	disgruntlement,	or	the	promise	of	
compensation	for	stealing	inside	secrets	(insider	with	intent)”.	(Jackson	2012,	117).	
	
Often	insider	employers	in	companies	and	organizations	forget	that	the	most	dan-
gerous	threat	can	be	an	insider.	That	is	worth	of	consideration	because	an	employee	
may	have	access	to	classified	information	or	proprietary	information	and	share	it	
forward	or	even	sell	it	to	someone	who	needs	the	data.	For	instance,	someone’s	
spouse	is	very	jealous	about	an	ex-fiancée	and	wants	to	see	her	health	data	because	
he	wants	to	damage	her	reputation	with	gossip	talking.	The	internal	employee	may	
use	some	systems	at	her	workplace	to	search	data	from	different	systems	and	collect	
some	data	pieces	to	start	gossiping	on	Facebook.	Often	such	cases	end	with	an	inter-
nal	audit	and	they	employee	may	lose	her	job,	which	is	considered	as	cyber	theft	and	
cyber	bullying.	
	
However,	it	is	not	so	simple	in	all	cases.	Sometimes	an	insider	might	be	clever	and	
seek	a	partner	to	get	assistance	in	delivery	and	distribution	of	restricted	material.	
This	can	be	the	case	especially	when	the	amount	of	data	is	very	big	or	the	data	is	
really	sensitive.	In	the	wildest	scenario	the	insider	is	recruited	by	foreign	intelligence	
service;	however,	that	is	not	the	case	with	ex-fiancées.	(Jackson	2012,	83).	
	
The	trusted	insider	always	uses	insider	methods	of	operations	(Jackson	2012,	285).	
For	instance,	the	thief	could	first	gain	access,	locate	the	valuable	asset	in	the	net-
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work,	steal	the	asset	from	the	network,	store	the	stolen	data	and	pass	it	forward.	A	
good	example	of	the	suspected	thief	was	a	recent	Ashley	Madison	database	leak	by	
female	who	worked	for	Avid	Life	Media	(McAfee	2015).	
	
4.11.3 Insider	without	intent	
“The	insider	working	in	collusion	with	or	being	duped	by	an	outsider	to	facilitate	
damage	and	loss	(insider	without	intent)”	(Jackson	2012,	117).	
	
Sometimes	an	insider	does	not	know	to	be	part	of	the	crime	and	it	also	happens	in	
health	care	area.	Understanding	the	dark	side	of	people’s	intentions	may	reveal	very	
clever	attacks.	A	typical	example	could	be	a	social	engineering	attack	where	someone	
gets	a	new	friend	from	the	organization	and	after	a	nice	beginning	the	attacker	tries	
to	get	classified	or	sensitive	data	from	the	insider	without	intent.	A	well-crafted	so-
cial	engineering	attack	might	take	place	very	slowly	and	the	insider	without	intent	
does	not	even	know	that	s/he	has	been	a	part	of	the	crime.	Sometimes	social	engi-
neering	may	occur	with	dating	someone	from	the	organization.	When	someone	falls	
in	love	they	might	be	easy	targets	for	social	engineering	attacks;	however,	then	the	
price	must	be	very	precious.	(Jackson	2012,	117).	
	
4.12 Generation	of	new	attacks	
Generation	of	new	attacks	takes	place	in	three	approaches:	modifying	existing	at-
tacks,	creating	them	from	scratch	or	getting	all	the	organization	data	and	building	an	
attack	based	on	that.	From	national	point	of	security	views	maximization	of	cyber-
attacks	needs	also	factors	that	help	to	boost	an	attack;	however,	it	is	applicable	in	a	
much	wider	scale.	The	first	factor	is	that	attacks	are	a	surprise	and	therefore	com-
pletely	unexpected.		The	second	and	even	more	important	factor	is	to	have	a	new	
attack	form	to	avoid	recognizing	it.	The	third	factor	is	that	the	attack	needs	to	be	
harmful.	The	fourth	and	last	factor	is	that	the	attack	should	be	well	camouflaged	and	
thus	deceptive.	A	deceptive	attack	form	is	particularly	important	on	the	national	lev-
el	(Jackson	2012,	128	and	147).	
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The	generation	of	new	attacks	is	not	easy	task	but	the	skilled	attackers	with	create	
attacks	from	scratch	and	avoid	the	detection.	(Jackson	2012,	128).	
	
Existing	attacks	are	good	starting	point	for	modifying	a	new	attack.	Attacker	just	se-
lects	existing	attack,	modifies	it	and	use	it.	Idea	is	to	modify	the	attack	so	that	the	
signature	detection	does	not	notice	it.	(Jackson	2012,	128)	
	
4.13 Attack	detection	
As	attackers	tend	to	be	deceptive	there	must	be	ways	to	detect	the	attacks.	One	way	
to	detect	attacks	is	to	use	security	audits.	According	to	Vatanen	(2014,	89),	an	at-
tacker	might	eavesdrop	systems	and	conceal	their	existence	completely	without	no-
one	knowing.	On	the	other	hand,	Finnish	privacy	law	is	not	clear	enough	and	there-
fore	it	prevents	data	collection	thoroughly	so	different	tactics	are	required	to	pre-
vent	cyber	theft	and	espionage.		
	
4.14 APT	–	Advanced	Persistent	Threat	
The	most	dangerous	cyber	threat	is	an	advanced	persistent	threat.	Basically	it	can	be	
formed	by	one	or	more	people	and	it	is	often	extremely	well	crafted	for	some	specif-
ic	target	or	entity.	Highly	advanced	viruses	have	been	on	the	internet	for	many	years	
and	often	they	originate	from	national	level.	Examples	of	countries	typical	to	use	APT	
attacks	are	China,	Israel,	Russia	and	USA;	however,	the	list	is	not	limited	to	these.	
APT	can	be	very	deceptive	and	even	trained	security	personnel	will	not	notice	them	
easily.	Basically,	searching	for	them	is	like	finding	a	needle	in	the	proverbial	haystack	
if	there	is	no	clue	of	the	most	valuable	assets	(Advanced	Persistent	Threat	2013,	
Cole).	
	
4.15 Cyber	crimes	
Crimes	are	carried	out	to	achieve	benefits	with	something	desirable	or	cause	some-
thing	bad	to	victims	(Jackson	2012,	272).	Few	decades	ago	personal	data	theft	was	
possible	for	instance	by	copying	or	taking	photos	of	documents	and	this	took	place	
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on	numerous	espionage	cases.	Based	on	global	threat	analysis	(Jackson	2012,	141-
142),	one	of	the	highest	probabilities	for	future	crimes	is	cyber	theft	and	basically	the	
reason	behind	of	that	is	that	the	adversaries	use	previously	unknown	patterns	to	
avoid	signature	detection	(see	chapter	4.16).		
	
Jackson	describes	cyber	attack	or	cyber	theft	by	following	clause:	“Cyber	attack	/	
cyber	theft	is	strong	alternative	that	affords	anonymity”	(Jackson	2012,	78).	Basically	
it	stands	for	that	attacker	is	often	unknown	especially	when	using	the	Internet	envi-
ronment,	however;	it	applies	also	to	internal	threats	since	insider	can	commit	cyber	
attack	with	all	the	available	information.	Cyber	theft	itself	is	not	a	new	threat;	how-
ever,	as	health	care	services	are	more	and	more	on	the	Internet	the	probability	of	
theft	rises.	
	
Technical	network	security	is	reactive	and	thus	not	safe	enough	to	protect	the	data.	
Nevertheless,	it	does	not	stand	for	forgetting	reactive	aspects	but	instead	of	that	
moving	the	focus	on	preventive	aspects.			
	
Targeting	health	care	area	is	expected	from	curious,	jealous,	hostile	or	even	terrorist	
types	of	people.	In	the	worst	case	loss	of	lives	may	follow	if	known	patterns	are	ex-
ploited.	Finding	flaws	takes	place	with	recognizing	and	understanding	the	patterns	of	
health	care	processes.	In	the	field	of	software	processes	it	is	essential	to	understand	
these	patterns	and	continuously	follow-up	and	inspect	processes.		Ideally	the	target	
is	to	recognize	possible	flaws	in	software	and	more	importantly,	in	the	overall	pro-
cesses	regarding	the	software	that	implements	health	care	processes.	The	probability	
for	cyber	theft	is	now	frequent	–	even	a	daily	matter	-	and	an	adversary	can	be	any-
one;	however,	in	most	dangerous	context	they	can	be	state-sponsored	entities,	for-
eign	intelligences	and	intelligence	gathering.	(Jackson	2012,	142).	
	
4.16 Signature	detection		
	
Signature	detection	is	the	recognition	of	known	patterns	on	a	specific	context.	It	is	
often	seen	as	a	part	of	cyber	context;	however,	in	reality	it	can	be	used	nearly	in	any	
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other	context	(Jackson	2012,	141).	In	cyber	context	for	instance	network	traffic	is	a	
series	of	bytes,	and	bytes	are	combined	to	packets.	Typically	known	remote	attacks	
contain	a	known	signature	that	is	built	of	the	known	series	of	bytes,	and	this	signa-
ture	is	easy	to	form	of	the	byte	series;	however,	modifying	the	attack	causes	the	sit-
uation	when	the	signature	is	different	and	therefore	not	detected	nor	necessarily	
prevented	anymore.		Signature	detection	can	be	seen	as	a	pattern	model	that	sup-
ports	former	known	attacks	or	security	violations	done	in	past.	Signatures	are	also	
prone	to	false	negatives	and	especially	in	systems	where	the	signatures	are	over-
tuned.	(Jackson	2012,	80).	
	
A	horrifying	example	of	exploiting	the	known	signature	detection	was	Germanwings	
plane	crash	where	Andreas	Lubiz	locked	the	cockpit	door	when	the	captain	left	the	
cockpit	and	after	that	flew	the	plane	to	the	mountain	and	killed	150	people	in	the	
French	Alps.	(The	Guardian,	2015).	The	captain	could	not	get	into	the	cockpit	be-
cause	of	a	flaw	in	the	known	attack	signature.	9/11	attack	caused	strict	procedure	
changes	to	cockpit	door	security	that	have	existed	since	1980s;	however,	it	could	not	
take	into	account	that	cockpit	must	always	have	two	pilots.	(Tribute	2015).	It	is	not	
an	example	of	a	cyber	attack;	however,	it	presents	a	perfect	example	on	how	to	ex-
ploit	known	patterns	and	cause	disaster	with	exploiting	known	patterns.	Signature	
detection	is	always	based	on	data	from	the	past	and	it	covers	basically	only	known	
attacks,	and	therefore	it	is	always	one	step	behind	the	attackers.	(Jackson	2012,	80).	
	
Human	expertise	is	essential	to	craft	proper	signatures	and	rules	for	anomalies.	Basi-
cally,	the	problem	is	that	machines	can	apply	different	algorithms,	recognize	signa-
ture	and	report	found	anomalies;	nevertheless,	human	expertise	is	still	required	in	
forensics	to	recognize	evidences.	(Jackson	2012,	80).	
	
4.17 Anomaly	detection	
	
Anomaly	detection	means	identifying	that	something	acts	in	an	unusual	way	or	
something	is	not	considered	normal	when	comparing	to	known	data	of	the	target.	
For	instance,	it	is	no	anomaly	if	somebody	wears	a	dinner	jacket	when	s/he	is	going	
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to	play	football.	(Jackson	2012,	266).	Anomaly	detection	uses	statistical	science	ap-
proach	to	find	out	differences	from	typical	network	traffic	averages	(statistical	
norms).	The	network	traffic	can	be	tracked	continuously,	and	statistical	data	of	typi-
cal	network	traffic	can	be	collected	around	the	clock.	For	instance,	it	could	be	normal	
that	employees	use	FTP	during	work	time	in	company’s	internal	network	and	there-
fore	its	normal.	However,	it	is	an	anomaly	if	someone	starts	FTP	connection	to	China	
in	the	middle	of	the	night	from	the	company’s	network.	Reflecting	on	Andreas	Lubiz’s	
locked	cockpit	door	example	in	March	2015,	the	captain	leaving	the	cockpit	was	an	
anomaly,	however,	it	was	noticed	only	after	the	plane’s	black	box	investigation	by	
the	French	officials.	Basically	in	such	a	situation	there	is	nothing	malicious,	neverthe-
less,	that	is	not	the	whole	picture.	
	
Anomaly	detection	has	its	benefits	to	notice	anomalies;	however,	the	problem	is	
about	indicating	malicious	activities	even	when	there	is	nothing	malicious	going	on	
(Jackson	2012,	269).	When	reflecting	on	the	captain	leaving	the	cockpit	the	anomaly	
exists,	however,	before	this	there	was	nothing	dangerous	based	on	the	earlier	expe-
riences	and	therefore	the	former	anomalies	have	been	completely	fine.	Now	the	
anomaly	was	the	captain	leaving	the	cockpit	and	the	first	officer’s	intention	to	lock	
the	captain	out	of	the	cockpit.	Making	the	difference	between	whether	an	anomaly	is	
good	or	bad	is	very	difficult	and	even	harder	when	all	details	are	not	known.	(The	
Guardian,	2015).		
	
4.18 Computer	crimes	
United	States	of	America	is	seen	as	one	of	the	promised	lands	in	the	cyber	security	
protection	due	to	its	political	and	national	position	in	the	world.		Computer	related	
crimes	have	caused	a	need	to	create	a	new	classification	for	them	and	even	new	sec-
tion	that	prosecutes	on	the	high	technology,	computer	crimes	and	intellectual	prop-
erty	offences.	The	mentioned	section	is	U.S.	Attorney’s	Office’s	Computer	Hacking	
and	Intellectual	Property	Section.	(Douglas,	Burgess,	Burgess	&	Ressler.	2006,	383).		
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Also,	the	crime	classification	guide	divides	computer	crimes	into	four	separate	classi-
fications:	”the	computer	as	the	target	of	the	crime	(510),	the	computer	user	as	the	
target	(520),	criminal	enterprise	(530),	and	threats	via	the	Internet	(540)”	(ibid.,	4)	
	
Table	11.	Crime	classification	manual	list	of	computer	crimes	in	USA	(adapted	from	
(Douglas,	A.W.	Burgess,	A.G.	Burgess	&	Ressler.	2006,	383-403)	
Crime	type	 Description	
510:	Computers	as	the	target	 The	victim	is	the	computer	itself	(not	
hardware)	and	especially	the	data	or	the	
software	stored	on	the	computer.	Target	
can	be	the	user,	the	trade	secrets,	the	
intellectual	property,	the	data	or	the	
software.		
511:	Malignant	software	 Any	harmful	or	malicious	software	like	
malware,	Trojan	horses,	viruses,	logic	
bombs	and	worms.		
512:	Computer	data	as	the	target	 Unauthorized	tampering	like	changing	
data,	replacing	data	or	creating	new	data	
on	the	computer.	For	example,	money	
transactions	or	stock	information	are	typ-
ical	targets	of	the	crimes	under	category	
512.	The	category	includes	the	software	
piracy	and	the	theft	of	intellectual	prop-
erty.	
512:	Denial	of	service	 The	target	is	attacked	with	denial	of	ser-
vice	by	the	offender.	
	
520:	The	computer	user	as	the	target	 Identity	theft	or	fraud	due	to	financial	
gain.	Stalking	(harassing	through	Inter-
net).	
521:	Identity	theft	 The	identity	data	stolen	from	user’s	
computer	using	the	internet.	The	identity	
used	for	the	other	crimes.	For	example:	
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Social	security	number,	credit	card,	PIN	
codes.	Includes	phishing.	
	
Does	not	include	“dumpster	diving”	or	
theft	of	wallet	or	other	item	with	im-
portant	data.	
522:	Invasion	of	privacy	 Unsolicited	sexually	explicit	material	or	
spam	through	Internet.		
523:	Cyberstalking	 Cyberstalking	is	synonym	for	the	stalking.	
However;	the	stalker	uses	the	computer	
to	follow	and	stalk	the	victim.	
	
530:	Criminal	enterprise	 Criminal	organization	crimes	with	a	
computer	or	Internet.	For	example	soft-
ware	piracy,	intellectual	property	on	
electronic	media,	child	pornography	and	
money	laundering	belongs	to	this	cate-
gory.	
531:	Money	laundering	 Money	laundering	tries	to	make	illegal	
funds	to	legal.		
532:	Child	pornography	 Child	pornography	on	computers	and	
networks.	
533:	Internet	fraud	
• 533.01:	Bank	fraud	
• 533.02:	Fraudulent	Internet	trans-
actions	
Computer	usage	for	fraud	like	credit	
card	or	bank	account	fraud.	Also	coun-
terfeits	of	the	ID	cards	or	passports	falls	
to	this	category.	
01:	The	internet	money	transfer	be-
tween	bank	accounts	with	any	fraud.	
02:	Purchasing	of	the	goods	but	the	buy-
er	never	receives	the	goods	due	to	
fraud.	
540:	Threats	via	the	Internet	 Threating	messages	delivered	through	
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Internet.	For	instance	a	computer	user,	
family	or	friends	are	threatened	with	
bodily	harm	or	destruction	of	some-
thing.	
	
5 Implementing	the	research	project	
The	following	chapters	contain	the	description	of	the	implementation	of	the	research	
project.	Initial	state,	first	approach	with:	ABA	attack	library,	the	second	approach	
with	STRIDE	and	CAPEC,	Elevation	of	privilege	card	game	description,	the	game	rules	
and	the	implementation	summary.	The	creation	of	the	author’s	own	model	is	a	part	
of	the	implementation,	and	it	is	located	in	the	next	main	chapter	
	
5.1 	Implementation	summary	
The	literature	analysis	approach	and	in	the	end	practical	workshops	with	a	self-
completed	questionnaire	as	a	secondary	method	generated	the	backbone	for	this	
thesis.	The	research	project	was	organized	into	9	main	steps	(Table	12),	and	planning	
and	implementation	followed	the	research	questions	as	much	as	possible.	The	re-
search	questions	are	listed	below	for	the	sake	of	clarity.	
	
Research	questions:	
What	appropriate	risk	and	security	models	already	exist?	
Which	existing	risk	and	security	model	fits	best	for	health	care	software	development	
processes?	
What	are	the	weaknesses	of	existing	models?	
Does	the	developed	health	care	specific	risk	and	threat	model	offer	better	risk	and	
security	management	than	generic	models?	
	
The	following	table	contains	the	research	steps	and	a	short	description	of	every	re-
search	step.		
	
Table	12.	Research	project	steps	
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Stage	 Description	
Literature	research	 Collected	data	and	references	from	liter-
ature	and	electronic	sources.	Creation	of	
thesis	template	from	scratch.	
Analysis	and	interpretation	of	found	risk	
and	threat	models	
Analysis	of	data,	interpretation	to	the	
thesis.	Preliminary	evaluation	and	discus-
sions	with	the	employer.	
Ideation	based	on	analysis	and	interpre-
tation	
Collected	ideas	and	continued	literature	
research	based	on	new	data.	
Development	of	the	own	threat	model	 Initial	ABA	attack	library	model	devel-
oped.	Development	cancelled	after	first	
version.	
Selection	of	2	–	3	most	suitable	methods	
for	agile	development	teams	
Selected	STRIDE	and	CAPEC	based	on	
literature	analysis	and	feedback	from	
employer.		
Planning	the	practical	workshops	for	de-
velopment	teams	
Approach	with	gamification	for	STRIDE	
and	learning	by	doing	approach	for	
CAPEC.	
Practical	workshops	 5	workshops	held	in	Finland	and	Sweden.	
One	workshop	cancelled	in	Norway	and	2	
workshops	in	Ostrava.	
Respondents	empirical	data	analysis	and	
literature	data	final	interpretation	and	
connecting	it	to	the	research	questions	
Main	analysis	and	recommendations	
based	on	collected	data.	
Conclusions	and	further	research	 Finalize	thesis.	
	
	
5.2 Initial	state	
The	teams	did	not	use	specific	risk	or	threat	models,	and	the	existing	process	did	not	
take	threat	modelling	into	account.	Some	professionals	got	security	area	knowledge	
in	the	organization,	and	employees	have	participated	in	security	workshops.	Security	
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audits	are	part	of	the	software	security.	All	new	software	is	produced	with	modern	
software	development	methods	following	contracts,	regulations	and	laws	but	organi-
zation	needs	to	take	security	to	part	of	daily	development	processes.	Modern	soft-
ware	development	methods	mean	agile	and	lean	methods	in	this	case;	however;	due	
to	employer’s	co-operating	negotiations	in	autumn	2014	the	business	scope	of	the	
thesis	was	internally	updated	since	the	author	was	moved	to	Tieto’s	internal	Indus-
trial	internet	start-up.	Therefore,	the	practical	part	of	the	thesis	contains	a	team	from	
Healthcare	and	multiple	teams	from	Industrial	internet.	Both	units	use	lean	and	agile	
methods.	However;	since	the	Industrial	internet	started	in	autumn	2014	the	organi-
zation	maturity	was	in	completely	different	state	than	the	Healthcare	organization.	
	
5.3 First	approach:	ABA	attack	library	model	
The	writing	of	the	literature	review	and	initial	thesis	version	started	in	July	2014	and	
in	a	month	the	first	set	of	data	was	built	up.	The	idea	was	to	evaluate	the	models	in	
October	-	November	2014	with	healthcare	development	teams,	since	Healthcare’s	
calendar	looked	optimal	for	practical	tests	in	the	autumn;	however,	the	author’s	cal-
endar	free	time	in	autumn	was	filled	with	a	surprisingly	demanding	cyber	security	
exercise	course	as	the	author	was	part	of	the	red	team	that	had	to	build	game	sce-
narios	with	the	white	team.	
	
The	thesis	was	restarted	in	February	2015	when	the	first	idea	of	an	own	model	was	
invented,	and	in	spring	some	sketches	were	created.	At	the	same	time	the	author	
started	to	have	meetings	every	second	week	to	get	the	latest	status	updates	of	the	
work.	The	first	real	model	on	the	thesis	was	invented	and	written	in	March	2015	–	
May	2015;	however,	in	one	weekly	status	meeting	in	May	it	was	decided	to	cancel	
that	and	concentrate	only	on	the	existing	models.	That	was	frustrating	since	the	au-
thor	had	spent	almost	4	months	on	the	model	creation.	However;	as	a	result	the	
former	literature	review	offered	many	applicable	sources	for	further	evaluation,	and	
the	second	attempt	started	with	full	speed.	The	last	updates	and	changes	to	the	own	
model	were	made	in	November	2015	due	to	model	walkthrough	when	the	thesis	was	
submitted	to	the	university.	
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5.4 Second	approach:	STRIDE	and	CAPEC	
The	second	approach	started	with	another	literature	review,	and	since	the	first	ap-
proach	material	was	not	anymore	applicable,	it	was	not	clear	at	all	which	models	
would	fit	for	healthcare	purposes.	The	answer	was	found	from	agile	models	world	
since	they	concentrate	a	great	deal	on	doing	instead	of	strong	documentation.	A	vast	
amount	of	models	were	abandoned	since	they	demanded	too	much	from	the	team	
or	organization.	
	
DREAD	was	interesting	and	one	idea	was	to	use	it	since	it	was	quite	straightforward	
to	use;	however,	Microsoft	abandoned	the	model	in	2010	so	that	was	a	strong	indi-
cation	not	to	use	the	model.	The	model	is	documented	in	the	thesis	if	the	teams	
want	to	use	it	nevertheless.	Brainstorming	methods	were	easy	but	security	context	
was	missing	and	the	author	bases	his	opinion	on	literature	that	using	brainstorming	
only	does	not	help	the	security	in	an	organized	and	constructive	way.	
	
Microsoft’s	threat	modelling	methodology	is	definitely	useful	but	it	is	much	more	
than	just	threat	modelling.	It	is	an	actual	process	family	that	helps	to	build	complete	
security	during	software	development,	due	to	which	Microsoft	SDL	was	ignored.	
STRIDE	was	the	first	model	that	could	fit	for	agile	software	development	since	it	can	
help	any	software	development	team	to	build	good	defenses	with	a	small	effort.	DE-
SIST	was	an	interesting	STRIDE	variant	and	even	though	it	could	fit	for	agile	develop-
ment	the	author	could	not	find	enough	material	or	literature	regarding	to	that,	thus,	
the	model	was	ignored.	
	
P.A.S.T.A	was	a	strong	attack	simulation	process	and	it	was	the	most	promising	to	
improve	security;	however,	it	was	way	too	heavy	for	small	agile	teams	and	due	to	
that	it	was	ignored.	TARA	was	found	in	September	2015	and	was	not	selected	to	
tests	since	found	it	too	late.	Based	on	materials	it	could	be	a	very	good	model	for	the	
purposes	of	health	care	and	agile	development	team;	however,	practical	tests	and	
some	material	building	is	needed.	
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TRIKE	was	as	well	a	promising	model	and	its	advantage	was	threat	modelling	auto-
mation.	However;	it	was	based	on	Excel	spreadsheets,	and	there	was	no	literature	
regarding	to	the	model	so	it	was	decided	to	ignore	it	since	it	was	not	mature	enough.		
	
CAPEC	was	the	only	big	and	clear	attack	pattern	library	but	OWASP	TOP-10	was	also	
a	good	choice.	However;	it	was	decided	to	go	with	CAPEC	since	Tieto’s	healthcare	
organization	products	are	much	more	than	just	web	applications.		Eventually	it	was	
decided	to	select	STRIDE	and	CAPEC	for	further	evaluation.	OWASP	TOP-10	was	the	
third	model	but	it	was	decided	to	leave	it	out	due	to	the	project	timetable.		
	
5.4.1 Workshops	ideation	and	planning	
After	STRIDE	and	CAPEC	were	selected	as	primary	methods	planning	and	preparation	
activities	for	workshops	had	to	be	started.	The	first	idea	was	to	have	a	PowerPoint	
presentation	and	additionally	one	A4	description	per	each	STRIDE	element.	After	that	
the	teams	were	expected	to	carry	out	practical	tasks;	however,	based	on	earlier	ex-
periences	many	people	tend	to	get	frustrated	and	give	negative	feedback	for	such	
workshops.	Therefore	it	was	decided	to	find	out	something	more	interesting	to	avoid	
workshop	with	negative	results.	
	
Based	on	literature	analysis	Elevation	of	privilege	card	game	was	found,	Blackhat	
presentation	was	watched	regarding	to	the	EoP	game	and	after	that	it	was	decided	
to	use	it	instead	of	using	a	typical	and	obviously	boring	teaching	method,	Hence	
STRIDE	workshop	part	decided	to	build	on	a	gamification	approach	with	elevation	of	
privilege	card	game.	Since	CAPEC	was	just	an	attack	library	it	was	decided	to	present	
it	with	a	short	PowerPoint	presentation	and	then	give	the	task	to	workshop	partici-
pants	to	link	the	applicable	attack	patterns	to	the	findings.	In	the	planning	phase	the	
author	did	not	know	what	the	reality	would	be.	
	
The	elevation	of	privilege	card	game	was	found	from	The	Game	Crafter	web	shop;	
however,	the	price	was	an	obstacle	for	multiple	card	decks.	(The	Game	crafter,	
2015).	It	was	decided	to	print	cards	with	colour	printer	and	laminate	them	at	home.	
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Totally	3	card	decks	were	printed	and	laminated	in	few	days.	Two	decks	are	in	Swe-
den	and	one	deck	was	used	in	other	workshops.	
	
The	first	workshop	was	partially	a	failure	since	too	short	amount	of	time		was	re-
served	for	the	workshop.	There	were	some	unclear	issues	and	it	was	decided	to	fix	
them	by	the	upcoming	workshop.	The	second	workshop	was	held	in	Linköping	and	
was	a	successful	case.	The	third	workshop	was	held	in	Helsinki	with	an	architect	team	
and	it	was	successful	as	well.	The	fourth	workshop	was	held	remotely	with	Karlstad	
and	it	worked	fine,	nevertheless,	it	was	decided	that	it	is	the	last	remote	workshop	
since	there	were	too	many	practical	problems.	The	fifth	and	last	workshop	was	held	
at	Oulu	with	Tieto’s	Healthcare	area	product	team.	One	team	in	Norway	cancelled	
the	workshop	and	two	workshops	were	cancelled	in	Czech.	
	
Based	on	good	feedback	the	real	card	decks	were	ordered	from	The	Game	Crafter	
webshop	to	Tieto’s	Industrial	Internet	unit.	
	
5.4.2 Workshop	structure		
The	workshop	consumes	one	working	day;	however,	the	first	workshop	was	held	in	4	
hours,	which	was	a	way	too	short	time.	For	other	teams	the	workshop	length	was	
about	one	working	day	with	breaks	and	lunch	between	9:00	–	16:00.	
	
Preliminary	requirements:	
An	application	diagram	with	API	interface	is	needed	to	describe	the	interfaces	on	a	
generic	level.	The	elevation	of	privilege	game	is	probably	easiest	to	start	with	a	ge-
neric	architecture	picture	with	3rd	party	connections.	Another	possibility	is	to	use	
whiteboard:	one	team	decided	to	use	the	whiteboard	instead	of	a	drawn	picture	as	a	
facilitator	instructed	that	the	team	should	select	at	least	one	figure	for	the	workshop.		
	
Agenda:	
1. STRIDE	PowerPoint	presentation	and	few	supporting	videos	for	the	workshop.	
Length	maximum	one	hour.	
2. Finding	threats	with	Elevation	of	Privilege	card	game	
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3. Microsoft’s	threat	modelling	tool	
4. PowerPoint:	CAPEC.	Length	maximum	0.5	hours	
5. Apply	CAPEC's	attack	patterns	on	the	findings	that	found	during	the	Elevation	
of	Privilege	card	game.	
6. Submit	a	questionnaire	and	answer	the	questions.		
	
	
Background	data	for	the	workshop:	
This	workshop	is	part	of	my	Master's	thesis	for	Tieto's	healtcare.	The	name	of	the	
thesis	is	"Security	Risk	and	Threat	Models	for	Health	Care	Product	Development	Pro-
cesses".	Its	purpose	is	to	research	existing	risk	and	threat	models	and	find	out	a	way	
for	agile	teams	to	improve	the	security	on	software	development.	The	assignment	
was	given	by	Tieto's	healthcare	(Jyväskylä)	by	Heikki-Pekka	Noronen.	
	
University:	
JAMK	University	of	Applied	Sciences	
http://www.jamk.fi/en/Education/Technology-and-Transport/Information-
Technology-Masters-Degree/		
	
5.4.3 Elevation	of	privilege	card	game	
The	Elevation	of	privilege	is	a	card	game	for	learning	the	STRIDE	threat	model.	The	
game	is	a	close	variant	of	trick	taking	card	games	but	the	deck	does	not	contain	tradi-
tional	suits	spades,	hearts,	diamonds	or	clubs.	EoP	uses	STRIDE	threat	model	suit	
(Spoofing,	Tampering,	Repudiation,	Information	disclosure	and	Elevation	of	privi-
lege).	The	purpose	of	the	game	is	to	teach	security	in	a	fun	way	with	STRIDE’s	securi-
ty	elements.	
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Figure	10.	Colour	printed	and	laminated	Elevation	of	privilege	card	deck	
	
5.4.4 EoP	rules	with	CAPEC	mapping	
This	variant	of	the	original	EoP	game	is	played	clockwise	and	the	rules	are	modified	
by	the	author	based	on	practical	experiences	during	the	workshops	and	the	received	
feedback	on	questionnaire.	The	optional	amount	of	players	3	–	6	and	the	players	
need	to	agree	who	fills	the	findings	and	score	to	the	spreadsheet.	The	spreadsheet	
should	contain	columns	Name,	Points,	Card,	Components,	Notes	on	threat,	CAPEC	
link	and	JIRA	ticket	/	bug	report	/	feature	request.	
	
Game	goals:	
• The	goal	is	to	start	looking	your	software	security	design	with	STRIDE	as	easy	
as	possible	
• Raise	discussion	about	the	threats	towards	your	system	or	its	application	in-
terfaces	
• Have	fun	and	learn	with	gamification	approach	style	
	
Points	and	winner:	
• +2	for	a	threat	on	your	card	if	you	can	address	it	(Use	timer	to	set	max	2	–	3	
minutes	time	to	think	about	the	threat	possibility.)	
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• +1	for	threat	if	another	player	can	address	it	right	after	first	player	stops	or	
time	is	out.	
• +1	for	taking	the	trick	(with	5	cards	it	is	possible	to	gain	5	tricks	since	each	
round	have	always	winner)	
• With	5	cards	the	game	has	5	rounds	
• Winner	is	the	player	with	the	highest	score	(possible	prize	can	be	decided	by	
team)	
	
Rules:	
1. The	dealer	shuffles	the	cards	face	down.	
2. The	dealer	shares	5	cards	to	each	player	
3. Play	starts	with	the	card	3	of	Tampering.	
4. Player	reads	the	card	and	announces	the	threat.	Player	scores	if	(s)he	can	ad-
dress	threat	described	on	the	card.	
5. Scorekeeper	fills	the	spreadsheet	and	possibly	gained	score	down.	
6. Each	player	in	turn	follows	the	suit	if	they	have	a	card	in	the	suit.	
7. In	each	round	the	high	card	takes	the	trick	or	with	Elevation	of	Privilege	tak-
ing	precedence	over	the	suit	lead.	
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Figure	11.	Queen	of	Tampering	wins	the	trick	
	
5.4.5 Creation	of	Questionnaire:	Security	risk	and	threat	models	
Originally	the	first	version	of	questionnaire	was	written	in	Word;	however,	moving	
the	question	set	to	JAMK’s	Webropol	was	a	surprisingly	difficult	task.	Then	it	was	
tried	to	create	a	second	version	with	the	tool;	however,	the	application	usage	was	
not	as	straightforward	as	expected	and	also	the	new	version	was	tried	but	certain	
question	types	were	missing,	after	which	it	was	decided	to	go	for	Google	Forms.	The	
author	managed	to	create	the	final	version	questionnaire	in	two	working	days	after	
few	iterations.	The	question	set	reflects	on	the	research	questions	but	its	main	points	
were	to	figure	out	the	compatibility	for	agile	development,	how	easy	the	model	is	to	
understand	and	apply,	and	how	much	it	helps	to	recognize	risks,	threat,	vulnerabili-
ties,	weaknesses.	
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5.4.6 Implementation	summary	
The	literature	analysis	approach	and	in	the	end	practical	workshops	with	a	self-
completed	questionnaire	as	a	secondary	method	generated	the	backbone	for	this	
thesis.	The	research	project	was	organized	into	9	main	steps	(Table	12),	and	planning	
and	implementation	followed	the	research	questions	as	much	as	possible.	The	re-
search	questions	are	listed	below	for	the	sake	of	clarity.	
	
Research	questions:	
1. What	appropriate	risk	and	security	models	already	exist?	
2. Which	existing	risk	and	security	model	fits	best	for	health	care	software	de-
velopment	processes?	
3. What	are	the	weaknesses	of	existing	models?	
4. Does	the	developed	health	care	specific	risk	and	threat	model	offer	better	
risk	and	security	management	than	generic	models?	
	
The	following	table	contains	the	research	steps	and	a	short	description	of	every	re-
search	step.		
	
Table	12.	Research	project	steps	
Stage	 Description	
Literature	research	 Collected	data	and	references	from	liter-
ature	and	electronic	sources.	Creation	of	
thesis	template	from	scratch.	
Analysis	and	interpretation	of	found	risk	
and	threat	models	
Analysis	of	data,	interpretation	to	the	
thesis.	Preliminary	evaluation	and	discus-
sions	with	the	employer.	
Ideation	based	on	analysis	and	interpre-
tation	
Collected	ideas	and	continued	literature	
research	based	on	new	data.	
Development	of	the	own	threat	model	 Initial	ABA	attack	library	model	devel-
oped.	Development	cancelled	after	first	
version.	
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Selection	of	2	–	3	most	suitable	methods	
for	agile	development	teams	
Selected	STRIDE	and	CAPEC	based	on	
literature	analysis	and	feedback	from	
employer.		
Planning	the	practical	workshops	for	de-
velopment	teams	
Approach	with	gamification	for	STRIDE	
and	learning	by	doing	approach	for	
CAPEC.	
Practical	workshops	 5	workshops	held	in	Finland	and	Sweden.	
One	workshop	cancelled	in	Norway	and	2	
workshops	in	Ostrava.	
Respondents	empirical	data	analysis	and	
literature	data	final	interpretation	and	
connecting	it	to	the	research	questions	
Main	analysis	and	recommendations	
based	on	collected	data.	
Conclusions	and	further	research	 Finalize	thesis.	
	
	
6 Creation	of	own	model:	Applying	ABA	on	the	agile	models	
Creation	of	the	own	model	is	based	on	fourth	research	question.	However;	an	origi-
nal	idea	was	to	modify	the	existing	models	or	even	combine	them.	Understanding	
threat	modelling	on	healthcare	business	area	seemed	very	specific	case	and	in	spring	
2015	none	of	the	found	models	did	not	fit	perfectly	on	the	area.	Ideation	started	
around	agile	models,	threat	and	risk	based	literature	review	and	searching	of	other	
theses	from	Theseus.	
	
The	agile	methods	on	software	development	area	took	place	after	the	millennium	
(Manifesto	for	Agile	software	development,	2001).	The	agile	methods	are	nowadays	
commonly	used	models	in	software	development	houses	and	they	have	recently	tak-
en	over	of	the	waterfall	style	development	models.		For	instance,	few	popular	agile	
development	models	are	Scrum,	Kanban	and	Extreme	programming	(Noronen,	2014,	
14	–	22).	
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The	author’s	own	model	is	attempt	to	plan	compatible	threat	library	to	apply	with	
the	agile	development	methods.	Users	can	decide	the	agile	model	they	want	to	use.	
Originally	got	an	idea	for	the	own	model	by	coincidence	during	literature	review.	
Found	a	book	from	school’s	library	that	was	about	predicting	malicious	behaviour	
(Predicting	Malicious	Behaviour:	Tools	and	Techniques	for	Ensuring	Global	Security	
Jackson	(2012))	and	it	includes	guidance	for	the	patented	tools	to	predict	malicious	
behaviour	in	global	security.	However;	idea	of	the	own	model	formed	first	time	when	
read	the	successful	treatment	story	for	the	seemingly	intractable	problem	suffered	
by	a	mentally	disabled	person	(Jackson	2012,	476).	Eventually	idea	formed	when	
read	Pasi	Koistinen’s	master’s	thesis	about	security	development	model	for	agile	
teams	(Koistinen,	2013,	93).		
	
Based	on	study	of	ABA	model	and	existing	threat	models	including	author’s	real	life	
experience	of	the	agile	methods	leads	to	possibility	to	develop	a	risk	or	threat	model	
that	should	reveal	most	of	major	business	specific	security	flaws	during	software	de-
velopment.	Eventually,	the	model	applies	operating	conditioning	to	the	software	
development	processes	on	high	level.	
	
 
6.1 Combine	the	software	requirements,	agile	development	and	ABA	
Based	on	the	literature	review	there	are	no	antecedents-behaviour-consequences	
chain	applied	with	software	development	methods	before	this	thesis.	The	Jackson’s	
tools	and	techniques	are	definitely	useful	for	global	usage	but	they	are	too	heavy	and	
inconvenient	for	agile	software	development.	According	the	author	the	agile	soft-
ware	development	needs	light	and	easy	threat	model.	However;	numerous	scrum	or	
other	agile	method	based	security	models	exists	like	Microsoft	SDLC,	Cisco	SDLC	or	
OpenSAMM.	In	Finland	Pasi	Koistinen	has	evaluated	own	security	model	based	on	2	
years	research	work.	(Koistinen,	2013,	93).		
	
According	to	the	author,	previously	listed	models	are	considered	more	or	less	tech-
nical	but	they	do	not	take	peoples’	behaviour	into	account	in	deep	manner.	The	
mentioned	models	contain	a	wide	diversity	of	elements	too	comprehensive	for	a	
typical	agile	development	lifecycle.	Despite	of	agile	software	development	large	sys-
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tems	may	have	dozens	of	different	agile	development	teams	and	in	such	case	upper	
level	architecture	lead	is	required.	Another	important	viewpoint	is	that	technology	is	
not	the	only	way	to	stop	the	attacks.	Instead	of	that,	policies	can	answer	to	many	
threats.	(Jackson	2012,	129).	Therefore	the	risk	or	threat	model	that	is	based	on	ABA	
chain	can	offer	a	much	more	efficient	way	to	find	policies	and	other	ways	that	can	
prevent	attacks	without	technological	changes	to	the	software.	
	
6.2 ABA	risk	or	threat	model	
The	author’s	first	invented	risk	or	threat	model	attempt	is	based	on	ideation	is	an	
attack	library	style	approach	that	uses	behaviour	science	to	tries	to	prevent	most	
typical	security	violations	and	vulnerabilities	in	specific	context.	It	is	combination	of	
the	ABA	model,	PASTA’s	attack	patterns	and	the	CAPEC	attack	library.	The	model	
requires	building	the	library	from	scratch	and	continuous	maintenance	work.		
	
The	attack	library	should	eventually	be	capable	answer	to	the	all	types	of	threats	that	
are	typical	for	the	business	area.	For	instance	mitigating	the	information	disclosure	
style	threats	should	be	possible	with	the	model	since	the	most	likely	malicious	be-
haviour	is	properly	known	and	understood	beforehand.	Therefore	prevention	can	be	
carried	out	in	an	innovative	way	just	using	antecedents,	behaviour	and	consequences	
chain	to	describe	good	defence	pattern	for	the	attack.	The	attack	library	should	apply	
as	well	to	the	difficult	and	time	consuming	attacks	like	sophisticated	thefts,	zero-day	
attacks	and	insider	threats	like	the	snooping	done	by	the	system	developer.	The	de-
fence	patterns	are	built	on	real	life	cases	so	they	should	be	best	ways	to	mitigate	
similar	crimes	and	threats	in	future.	Most	importantly,	the	root	reasons	behind	the	
attack	should	be	documented	(Jackson	2012,	78).	
	
 
6.3 The	ABA	attack	library	model	description	
The	model	requires	a	follow	up	of	the	security	area	news	in	a	frequent	basis,	ABA	
analysis	for	the	found	news,	building	a	defence	pattern	regarding	to	the	news	adding	
the	data	to	the	database	and	linking	the	threat	to	CAPEC’s	attack	pattern	when	appli-
cable.	The	database	may	contain	predefined	crime	classes	based	on	Table	11,	how-
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ever,	the	classification	testing	is	currently	something	that	requires	first	database	im-
plementation.	The	one	idea	was	to	link	the	ABA	attack	library	to	the	crime	classifica-
tion	manual	list.	However;	since	the	most	of	the	attacks	are	already	well	described	
and	classified	in	other	attack	libraries,	the	one	very	useful	idea	towards	the	models	
would	be	usage	of	the	proper	attack	library.	According	to	Velez	&	Morana	(2015,	
462)	the	CAPEC	attack	library	can	be	used	for	the	own	attack	library	and	it	is	one	of	
the	most	advanced	attack	libraries	available.	Therefore	it	could	be	most	ideal	to	
combine	the	CAPEC	attack	library	XML	within	the	ABA	attack	library	model.		
	
Table	13.	The	ABA	attack	library	model	prototype	
Step	 Description	
Investigate	the	news	archives	and	news	
about	business	area	related	crimes	and	
threats	as	a	regular	basis.	Write	down	
the	cybercrimes	and	crimes	according	
to	the	business	area	and	analyse	them	
with	ABA.	
	
	
Investigate	found	cases	from	the	news	and	
analyse	each	case	with:	
• Events	and	situations	(anteced-
ents).	Basically	the	root	reason	or	
motive.	
• Actions	made	by	individual	or	
group	(behaviour)	
• Consequences	
	
Handle	the	found	cases	and	analyse	ante-
cedents	(events	and	situations),	actions	
and	consequences	based	on	news	articles	
and	any	applicable	source	regarding	to	the	
case.	
Define	the	defence	pattern	based	on	
ABA	analysis	or	use	existing	attack	pat-
terns	from	CAPEC.	
Defence	pattern	should	apply	to	business	
area	or	organization’s	needs.	The	pattern	
can	be	description	how	to	apply	policy,	
change	to	the	physical	security	or	adding	
the	surveillance	camera	prevent	the	inci-
dent.	When	applicable	it	is	good	to	use	
directly	CAPEC’s	attack	pattern.	
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Store	and	refine	the	data	to	the	data-
base	of	findings.	
Store	the	events	and	situations,	root	rea-
son,	motive,	actions	and	consequences.	
Classify	the	data	based	on	following	list:	
• Asset	/	target	
• Antecedents	
• Events	and	situations	
• Actions	
• Threat	
• Vulnerability	/	vulnerabilities	
• Defence	pattern	
• CAPEC	ID	when	applicable.	
• Impact	
Use	the	ABA	attack	library	for	the	soft-
ware	that	is	under	planning,	develop-
ment	or	maintenance.		Library	scope	
can	be	applied	to	complex	ensemble	of	
security	layers	so	not	only	for	software	
development.	
• Compare	the	business	/	organiza-
tion	specific	ABA	attack	library	in-
cidents	to	product,	product	envi-
ronment,	processes	and	so	on.	
• Use	defence	pattern	to	mitigate	
threats.	
• On	software	level	use	for	instance	
STRIDE	to	recognize	the	threats	as	
a	supportive	element.	
	
The	model	applies	the	PASTA’s	stage	six	to	identify	the	attack	surface	and	enumerate	
the	attack	vectors	on	the	storage	phase.	(Velez	&	Morana,	2015,	463).	
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6.4 Applying	the	new	and	former	incidents	
	
Figure	12	describes	the	main	process	of	applying	the	new	or	former	incidents	for	
threats	mitigation	and	it	is	graphical	representation	of	Table	13.	The	basic	idea	is	ap-
plicable	for	any	organization	or	business	area.	The	figure	describes	the	searching,	
mapping	the	antecedents,	actions	and	consequences	and	storing	the	data.			
	
		 	
	
Figure	12.	Applying	the	ABA	on	news	archives	to	add	a	new	entry	to	the	library	
	
The	first	step	of	the	attack	library	model	is	to	investigate	news	archives	about	the	
typical	business	or	organization	area	crimes	and	apply	ABA	on	them.	Use	of	multiple	
sources	when	possible	and	investigation	of	the	available	background	data	from	all	
available	sources	are	recommended.	Searching	the	same	incident	by	other	news	
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sources	might	reveal	new	data	regarding	to	the	case.	The	second	step	is	to	define	
defence	pattern	based	on	ABA	analysis	during	first	step.	The	events	and	situations	
can	be	also	handled	as	motive	or	root	reasons.	The	motive	stands	for	what	the	at-
tacker’s	aspirations	and	the	needs	to	commit	the	crime	are.	The	third	step	is	to	store	
and	refine	the	data	to	the	database.	The	fourth	step	to	apply	library	findings	for	the	
wanted	area	to	mitigate	and	defend	for	similar	attacks	in	future.	The	loop	should	be	
continuous	process	to	maintain	the	library	during	work.		
	
 
6.5 Further	ideas	for	the	usage	
The	management	can	use	the	ABA	attack	library	defence	patterns	to	do	decisions	for	
instance	for	the	product,	environment	or	processes.	For	instance	defence	patterns	
data	might	be	useful	when	selecting	security	criteria	or	ordering	audits.	The	following	
figure	illustrates	the	use	case	example	for	the	management.	
	
	
Figure	13.	Managers	and	ABA	attack	library	defence	patterns	
	
The	agile	development	teams	can	use	the	ABA	attack	library	to	improve	technical	
security	based	on	the	ABA	database	defence	patterns.	Figure	13	illustrates	the	use	
case	example	for	the	management.	
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Figure	14.	Scrum	teams	and	ABA	chain	related	security	
	
6.6 ABA	Attack	library	on	Scrum	
Figure	15	describes	the	usage	of	the	attack	library	in	the	agile	development	model	
lifecycle.	The	figure	does	not	contain	the	Scrum	or	Kanban	lifecycle	but	instead	of	
that	gives	a	conceptual	viewpoint	of	the	attack	library	usage	on	this	specific	context.		
	
The	asset	is	the	product	or	its	part	that	the	team	develops	within	the	agile	methods.	
The	first	part	is	planning	and	requirements,	the	second	is	architecture	and	design,	
the	third	is	development	and	implementation	and	the	fourth	phase	is	Testing	and	
evaluation.	The	deployment	is	the	last	part	and	often	done	after	one	or	more	devel-
opment	rounds.	The	health	care	attack	library	is	available	in	all	phases;	however,	it	is	
important	especially	for	planning	and	requirements	and	architecture	and	design.	
Eventually	the	delivery	will	be	done	after	testing	and	evaluation,	and	the	product	
should	be	safer	than	without	the	attack	library.	
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The	attack	library	should	be	applicable	on	generic	level	to	any	agile	model.	
	
Figure	15.	Health	care	specific	attack	library	usage	example	on	the	software	devel-
opment	projects	(adapted	from	Koistinen,	2013,	93)	
	
	
7 Research	results	based	on	questionnaire	
After	each	workshop	the	attendees	were	instructed	to	write	their	answers	onto	the	
Questionnaire:	Security	risk	and	threat	models.	The	questionnaire	was	sent	to	19	
persons	and	15	persons	answered	to	the	questionnaire.	Table	14	contains	generic	
data	of	the	teams	which	participated	to	the	workshop.	Also,	the	amount	of	evaluated	
systems	and	findings	is	listed	on	the	table;	however,	unfortunately	it	is	not	allowed	
to	include	the	findings	to	the	thesis	due	to	confidentiality	issues.	However;	all	STRIDE	
elements	were	used	and	the	criticality	of	the	findings	was	from	low	to	critical.	The	
evaluated	systems	were	on	proof-of-concept	phase,	development	phase	or	under	
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planning	phase,	which	definitely	stands	for	that	workshops	were	useful	and	provided	
meaningful	results.	
	
Table	14.	The	teams	that	performed	the	evaluation	
Team	 Participants	 Systems	 Amount	of	
findings	
Site	 Industry	
Development	
team	
4	 1	 9	 Jyväskylä,	
Finland	
Industrial	In-
ternet	
Development	
team	
4	 1	 10	 Linköping,	
Sweden	
Industrial	In-
ternet	
Architect	
team	
3	 2	 16	 Helsinki,	Fin-
land	
Industrial	In-
ternet	
Development	
team	
6	 1	 11	 Karlstad,	
Sweden	(re-
mote	
workshop)	
Industrial	In-
ternet	
Development	
team	
2	 1	 6	 Oulu,	Finland	 Healthcare	
Total	 19	 6	 52	 	 	
	
The	first	workshop	was	held	in	September	2015	due	to	summer	vacation	period	and	
project	schedules.	The	last	workshop	was	held	in	the	end	of	October	at	Oulu.	
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7.1 Basic	data	of	questionnaire		
	
Figure	16.	Participants	by	role	
	
As	seen	on	Figure	16,	the	classification	of	participants	was	not	perfectly	planned	
since	the	roles	were	not	set	as	expected.	A	strange	issue	on	the	findings	was	that	the	
teams	did	not	have	a	Scrum	master	or	the	Scrum	master	did	not	participate	at	all.	
The	author	is	the	Scrum	master	for	one	team	currently,	therefore	it	explains	the	case	
from	point	of	one	team.	The	roles	of	the	participants	were	mostly	developers,	archi-
tects,	one	chief	architect,	one	software	development	coach	and	one	“Sales,	BD,	
Product	owner”.		The	author	did	not	answer	to	the	questionnaire	at	all	since	a	per-
sonal	view	towards	the	models	is	definitely	biased.	
	
	
Figure	17.	Participated	in	training	
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13	participants	were	on	the	trainings	all	the	time.	Only	2	participants	reported	that	
they	joined	to	the	training	partially,	which	corresponds	also	to	the	author’s	view	of	
workshop	experiences.	
	
	
Figure	18.	Does	the	used	material	support	understanding	of	the	selected	threat	
models?	
	
The	material	was	seen	as	a	supportive	element	for	training,	and	small	improvements	
or	tweaks	were	made	after	each	workshop,	however,	on	written	feedback	a	com-
ment	was	received	that	the	examples	could	be	more	vivid.	Also,	one	workshop	was	
held	remotely	and	in	future	the	author’s	all	workshops	will	be	held	locally.	Based	on	
discussions	with	participants	more	practical	examples	could	be	useful	in	future.	The	
author	shares	the	view	and	for	best	possible	training	each	STRIDE	element	should	be	
represented	with	video	or	tangible	examples	drawn	on	a	whiteboard.	Generally	
speaking	the	PowerPoint	presentation,	Elevation	of	Privilege	game	and	YouTube	ex-
ample	videos	were	probably	fine,	however,	CAPEC	needs	gamification	style	approach	
or	something	else.	Just	linking	the	CAPEC	findings	to	the	found	issues	is	not	the	best	
way.		
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Figure	19.	Do	you	have	a	cybersecurity	background?	
	
The	diversity	of	the	answers	was	surprising	since	it	was	expected	that	people	do	not	
have	cyber	security	knowledge	at	all;	however,	four	participants	considered	that	they	
had	moderate	knowledge	and	two	respondents	evaluated	knowledge	on	higher	lev-
els	where	the	knowledge	is	expected	to	be	very	good.	Nevertheless;	from	the	point	
of	security	training	the	company	should	arrange	security	related	training	much	more	
to	tackle	down	the	growing	needs	of	security.	
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7.2 STRIDE	
	
	
Figure	20.	The	applied	threat	model	STRIDE	is	easy	to	understand	and	apply?	
	
It	was	found	out	afterwards	that	the	scale	of	the	answers	was	set	in	the	wrong	order.	
One	in	the	scale	meant	easy	and	5	meant	hard,	which	was	explained	to	the	partici-
pants	after	one	participant	commented	on	the	issue.	66%	of	answers	evaluated	
STRIDE	as	easy	to	understand	and	apply	with	the	majority	of	answers	on	values	one	
and	two.	Three	answers	were	set	to	three,	which	means	moderate	and	one	to	four	
that	stands	for	quite	hard.	Root	reason	is	very	difficult	to	evaluate;	however,	at	first	
the	workshop	was	not	fully	successful	since	it	suffered	from	time	problems	and	other	
small	drawbacks.	
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Figure	21.	STRIDE	support	to	recognize	risks,	threats,	vulnerabilities	and	weaknesses	
	
	
On	the	scale	one	meant	poor	and	five	meant	excellent.	Based	on	the	answers	the	
majority	of	the	answers	was	set	to	very	good	(four)	or	excellent	(five).	Based	on	
feedback	most	of	the	answers	evaluate	STRIDE	as	very	good	or	excellent	for	recogniz-
ing	the	risks.	In	the	planning	phase	it	seemed	a	good	idea	to	ask	about	the	suitability	
for	risks,	threats,	vulnerabilities,	weaknesses	and	agile;	however,	since	most	of	an-
swers	are	very	good	or	excellent	for	all	of	them,	there	must	have	been	misunder-
standing	between	the	terms.	In	the	author’s	opinion	STRIDE	is	not	a	good	model	for	
risk	evaluation	since	it	is	not	a	risk	model.	It	seems	that	4	participants	understood	
that	STRIDE	is	not	a	good	risk	model.	Clearly	the	problem	was	that	the	presentations	
did	not	contain	definitions	of	risks,	threats,	vulnerabilities	and	weaknesses	and	that	is	
definitely	design	flaw	on	the	workshops.	As	a	summary	it	seems	that	STRIDE	got	good	
admittance	from	the	teams.	
	
7.2.1 Stride	advantages	
Based	on	the	feedback	most	of	the	answers	evaluate	STRIDE	as	a	very	good	or	excel-
lent	model	for	better	security.		The	advantages	based	on	feedback	were	that	the	card	
game	was	an	easy	approach,	and	that	helps	to	raise	a	discussion	regarding	to	the	
system	security.	The	discussion	was	actually	very	good	in	all	teams	and	generally	
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people	are	really	interested	in	security	issues.	One	feedback	was	about	discovering	
threats	in	an	existing	product,	and	indeed,	the	model	works	on	planning	table	but	
also	on	the	evaluation	of	existing	systems.	
	
The	model	was	considered	lightweight	and	Microsoft’s	tool	support	was	considered		
a	benefit.	The	usage	of	the	model	was	possible	without	long	training	sessions	for	
developers.	The	gamification	approach	was	successful	so	the	author	can	definitely	
recommend	it	based	on	results.	
	
7.2.2 Stride	disadvantages	
STRIDE	was	considered	a	high	level	model	and	it	was	suspected	that	more	compe-
tence	for	detailed	analysis	was	needed.	Also,	finding	solutions	to	threats	was	consid-
ered	to	be	out	of	the	focus	in	this	model.	Definitely	one	of	the	problems	was	the	lack	
of	time	since	the	workshop	was	only	one	day	long	for	most	of	the	teams.		
	
The	model	needs	complementary	support	from	other	models	like	CAPEC	or	process-
es,	and	the	testing	viewpoint	was	missing	as	well.		One	comment	was	about	the	too	
diverse	discussions,	and	the	card	game	rules	also	need	improvements.	As	a	result	the	
card	game	rules	were	updated	for	this	thesis.	At	the	first	time	the	game	consumes	
easily	4	hours.		
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7.3 CAPEC	
	
Figure	22.	The	applied	threat	model	CAPEC	is	easy	to	understand	and	apply?	
	
The	scale	was	one	(easy)	to	five	(hard).	The	blue	bar	defines	how	easy	the	model	was	
to	understand	and	9	persons	evaluated	it	as	easy	or	quite	easy;	however,	especially	
on	written	feedback	the	model	was	evaluated	hard	and	boring.	
	
	
Figure	23.	CAPEC	support	to	recognize	risks,	threats,	vulnerabilities	and	weaknesses	
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CAPEC	part	on	the	workshop	was	something	that	caused	a	wide	diversity	of	answers,	
which	suffers	the	same	problem	as	STRIDE’s	answer	set.	The	participants	do	not	nec-
essarily	understand	the	difference	of	risks,	threats,	vulnerabilities	and	weaknesses	
since	those	terms	were	not	explained	in	the	presentation.	Criticism	is	understandable	
since	the	STRIDE’s	gamification	approach	was	more	entertaining	than	CAPEC’s	boring	
“search	and	map	the	correct	attack	pattern	to	the	findings	with	Google	search	or	
domain	based	search”.	Still,	on	many	comments	it	was	seen	that	it	is	a	good	support-
ive	element	for	STRIDE.	Generally	speaking	the	problem	was	the	CAPEC	part	in	the	
workshop,	not	the	model	itself.	One	interesting	viewpoint	on	the	CAPEC	was	that	
eleven	answers	of	fifteen	answers	were	good,	very	good	or	excellent	for	agile	com-
patibility.	Basically	what	this	stands	for	is	that	CAPEC	works	in	agile	development	
when	it	is	correctly	understood	and	used.		
	
On	results	analyzation	it	was	found	out	that	PowerPoint	presentations	did	not	in-
clude	deeper	CAPEC	description	since	many	patterns	consisted	of	several	elements	
e.g.	summary,	attack	execution	flow,	attack	prerequisites,	typical	severity,	resources	
required,	related	weaknesses	and	related	to	patterns.	That	was	a	flaw	on	the	work-
shop	materials	since	additional	elements	like	severity	helps	to	prioritize	the	found	
threat.	
	
7.3.1 CAPEC	advantages	
CAPEC	caused	a	great	deal	of	confused	feedback;	however,	in	many	feedbacks	it	was	
seen	that	a	big	attack	pattern	library	with	clearly	explained	patterns	was	a	benefit.	
Some	participants	considered	that	searching	was	easy	and	worked	right	away.	The	
structure	of	the	library	was	also	seen	as	good.	One	benefit	was	to	reproduce	recog-
nized	issues	and	apply	suggested	solutions	to	recognized	issues.	Cooperative	usage	
with	STRIDE	was	seen	as	a	benefit.	Based	on	the	answers	CAPEC	fits	for	agile	as	a	
supportive	element	and	is	a	working	pair	for	STRIDE	still	in	need	of	more	evaluation.	
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7.3.2 CAPEC	disadvantages	
In	the	feedbacks	CAPEC	was	mentioned	as	a	large,	complex,	exhaustive,	boring	and	
heavy	to	read	database.	Prioritization	finding	with	CAPEC	was	seen	as	difficult;	how-
ever,	it	is	not	necessarily	the	library’s	task	to	prioritize	issues	as	OWASP	TOP	10.	
Based	on	one	feedback	CAPEC	has	no	reasonable	way	to	use	and	never	should	be	
used	as	an	only	model.	The	clear	drawback	of	CAPEC	was	that	it	is	very	technology	
focused	but	still	new	technologies	were	not	considered	implicitly.	Lack	of	discussion	
was	seen	as	a	problem	as	well.		
	
7.4 Improvement	proposals	regarding	to	the	threat	models	usage	
Feedback	contained	many	good	improvement	proposals	for	the	future	threat	model-
ling	workshops	and	more	secure	software	development.	The	workshops	were	seen	
as	a	good	starting	point	for	security	improvements.	One	direct	and	fully	doable	im-
provement	idea	was	to	have	thesaurus	for	mapping	the	EoP	card	deck	cards	descrip-
tions	directly	to	CAPEC’s	attack	patterns	in	order	to	enhance	testability.	For	instance	
"6	Repudiation	normally	finds	CAPEC-<nn>,	CAPEC-<mm>	&	CAPEC-<ii>...".	
	
In	feedback	the	frequency	of	workshops	was	raised	as	an	important	issue	as	well	as	
adding	threat	modelling	as	part	of	typical	software	development	cycle	during	sprints.		
One	participant	also	requested	that	teams	should	have	a	different	threat	model	in	
workshops	as	a	frequent	basis,	which	could	be	a	good	idea;	however,	only	few	mod-
els	might	fit	the	agile	development	such	as	TARA,	DREAD	and	OWASP	TOP-10	but	
definitely	they	will	be	taken	into	account	also	in	the	future.		
	
Prioritization	and	defining	the	highest	risks	were	seen	very	important	and	that	is	def-
initely	true.	The	selected	models	did	not	take	the	risk	evaluation	into	account	so	af-
terwards	it	is	easy	to	say	that	TARA	or	DREAD	would	be	a	good	answer	for	the	high-
est	risk	addressing.	Also,	the	big	picture	handling	with	whiteboard	planning	sessions,	
defining	the	trust	boundaries	analysis	as	a	whole	in	combination	with	other	STRIDE	
tools	should	be	taken	into	account	on	threat	modelling	training.		
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To	summarize:	the	most	important	feedback	was	to	add	more	practicality	and	more	
than	one	workshop,	give	for	instance	tool	related	training	for	known	models,	do	
threat	modelling	frequently	as	a	part	of	sprints	and	take	highest	risks	and	trust	
boundaries	into	account.	
	
7.5 Improvement	proposals	regarding	to	training	
Clearly	one	most	wanted	improvement	was	that	more	than	one	workshop	was	need-
ed,	which	means	the	cross-sectional	approach	for	the	thesis	was	a	wrong	solution.	
Basically	a	better	approach	would	be	longitudinal	since	the	workshops	should	be	
held	at	least	2	or	3	times	for	same	area	and	the	models	evaluated	after	each	session.	
Also,	there	is	no	sense	to	have	too	short	workshops	so	one	day	timeframe	should	be	
reasonable	also	in	the	future.		
	
The	original	EoP	rules	from	the	card	deck	were	seen	problematic	so	the	new	instruc-
tions	were	updated	based	on	the	feedback	on	this	thesis.	Also,	well	planned	tutorial	
based	on	Microsoft	Threat	Modelling	tool	was	seen	as	an	important	part	and	it	was	
missing	from	the	contents	of	the	original	workshop.	
	
The	presentations	were	generally	good;	however,	continuous	improvements	are	
needed.	Threats	should	be	formatted	into	scenarios,	and	the	risk	modelling	should	
be	included	in	the	workshops.	Adding	DREAD	or	TARA	to	future	workshops	could	be	
needed	improvement.	Basically	better	examples	and	more	concrete	explanations	for	
the	terms	are	essential	in	future	workshops.		
	
8 Threat	models	evaluation	based	on	literature	
The	threat	model	evaluation	is	done	primarily	based	on	literature	analysis	but	re-
plenished	with	the	data	from	Internet’s	electronic	sources.	For	instance,	TRIKE	or	
DESIST	were	an	examples	of	a	models	which	does	not	have	the	easily	available	litera-
ture	describing	them.	The	secondary	evaluation	is	done	with	a	self-administered	
questionnaire.	The	threat	model	evaluation	is	supported	by	multiple	discussions	with	
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Tieto’s	representative;	however,	the	discussions	may	lead	to	biased	view	towards	the	
model	selection.	
	
According	to	held	discussions	with	Tieto’s	representative,	the	most	suitable	threat	
model	would	be:	
• It	should	answer	to	the	health	care	software	development	needs	
• Usage	of	the	threat	model	should	not	consume	too	much	time	
• It	should	not	be	too	laborious	
• It	should	be	easy	and	fun	to	learn	
• It	should	reveal	wide	range	of	the	security	threats	with	small	effort	
• It	should	work	well	together	with	Microsoft	products	
	
8.1 Brainstorming	evaluation	
Whenever	a	quick	and	light	model	is	needed,	the	brainstorming	methods	might	be	
useful;	however,	threats	might	be	difficult	or	even	impossible	to	point	out	and	as	a	
method	it	requires	removal	of	borders	and	scope.	On	the	other	hand,	threats	might	
be	very	dependent	on	the	participants	and	facilitation	of	the	brainstorming	meeting.	
Definition	of	the	exit	criteria	may	be	difficult	and	it	is	even	more	difficult	if	an	exit	
criterion	is	completely	missing.	(Shostack,	2014,	31-34).	In	the	author’s	view	brain-
storming	is	not	an	answer	for	the	healthcare	security	problems.	It	is	simply	a	model	
too	lightweight	and	does	not	contain	any	kind	of	security	approach.		
	
8.2 DREAD	evaluation	
The	model	was	meant	for	risk	modelling;	however,	the	model	is	not	a	good	choice	
anymore	since	the	results	are	not	useful	in	all	cases.	(Shostack	2014,	180).		Mi-
crosoft’s	SDL	team	will	not	recommend	the	usage	of	DREAD	anymore.	Therefore,	the	
model	can	be	considered	as	obsolete.	(Shostack	2014,	180)	and	it	is	not	selected	for	
the	further	evaluation.	In	the	author’s	view	DREAD	looks	simple	and	easy	to	imple-
ment.	It	could	be	an	easy	stepping	stone	towards	security;	however,	due	to	its	obso-
leted	status	it	is	not	a	choice	for	further	investigation	or	evaluation.	DREAD	was	very	
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interesting	model	since	it	answered	to	risk	evaluation	whereas	STRIDE	was	more	
about	recognizing	threats.	
	
	
8.3 STRIDE	evaluation	
The	gamification	approach	was	definitely	successful	for	teaching	STRIDE.	
In	the	author’s	view	STRIDE	was	a	very	promising	model.	It	has	few	clear	benefits;	
however,	it	also	contains	certain	disadvantages.	
	
Advantages	are	listed	below	based	on	literature	analysis	and	questionnaire:	
	
• Fits	for	agile	development	cycles	on	development	and	architectural	levels		
• The	evaluation	of	privilege	card	game	offers	easy	stepping	stones	for	any	de-
veloper.	Gamification	is	the	key	to	fun	learning.	
• Actively	supported	and	used	by	Microsoft	
• Free	Microsoft	Threat	Modelling	Tool	available	for	more	serious	usage.	
• Basically	fits	for	any	software,	not	only	for	Microsoft’s	products	
• Does	not	prevent	usage	of	other	threat	models	like	the	attack	libraries	
• Found	findings	are	possible	to	report	as	typical	bug	reports,	feature	requests	
or	other	tasks	
	
Disadvantages:	
	
• STRIDE	is	high	level	model	and	might	need	more	competence	for	detailed	
analysis	
• No	risk	based	approach	or	prioritizing	the	threats,	needs	another	model	or	
approach	to	resolve	prioritization	and	risks	handling	
• Does	not	take	technical	defences	into	account	
• CAPEC	compatibility	not	best	possible.		
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8.4 TARA	–	Threat	Agent	Risk	Assessment	evaluation	
TARA	was	the	last	found	security	risk	model	from	Internet	in	September	2015.	The	
model	came	up	by	coincidence	when	added	the	missing	references	to	the	thesis.	
Based	on	Intel’s	material	noticed	that	model	applies	quite	well	to	healthcare	area	risk	
filtering	but	not	necessarily	for	agile	development.	The	main	problem	with	TARA	was	
finding	the	literature	regarding	to	the	model.	However;	all	needed	material	is	on	In-
tel’s	website.		
	
Based	on	Intel’s	whitepaper	the	model’s	advantage	is	to	evaluate	big	amount	of	risks,	
put	them	in	understandable	form	on	big	picture	and	communicate	findings	to	further	
decision	making.	Disadvantage	is	that	model	does	not	take	impact	of	the	risk	into	
account.	The	model	might	be	too	heavy	for	typical	agile	development	team	but	still	
useful	for	architect	teams	or	the	specific	security	assessment	team.	However;	the	
model	needs	practical	testing	before	understanding	it	more	deeply	and	can	evaluate	
it	for	healthcare	purposes.	
	
The	model	supports	building	its	own	threat	agent	library	for	business	area	purposes	
and	basically	it	should	not	be	overly	difficult	or	time	consuming	job.	The	model	is	
recommended	be	taken	under	further	evaluation	if	the	organization	needs	the	model	
for	risk	evaluation	in	critical	projects.	Definitely	worth	of	thesis.	
	
8.5 PASTA	evaluation	
The	first	impression	of	the	model	expresses	a	throughout	structured	and	sturdy	
model	for	big	organizations	that	need	to	fight	against	new	type	of	threats;	however,	
the	model	consumes	resources	heavily	because	it	has	seven	main	stages	and	each	of	
them	have	many	demanding	requirements.	A	vast	amount	of	people	from	different	
roles	and	organization	levels	in	the	organization	is	required	to	participate.	Eventually,	
the	system	has	to	be	decomposed	to	components,	specific	data	flow	diagrams	and	
use	cases	if	not	done	before.	Basically,	a	reasonable	PASTA	usage	requires	imple-
menting	all	seven	stages	within	company’s	processes	and	that	requires	a	very	mature	
organization	and	a	very	strong	process	culture.	The	model	is	not	taken	to	further	
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evaluation	simply	because	it	consumes	too	much	resources	and	easily	approachable	
model	was	very	important;	however,	it	is	one	of	the	strongest	and	newest	models	
available	in	the	field,	thus,	whenever	the	security	must	be	on	very	high	levels	the	
organization	should	consider	it.	The	author’s	opinion	is	that	the	PASTA	would	be	one	
of	the	most	secure	choices	for	the	healthcare	software	development.	
	
8.6 TRIKE	evaluation	
The	author	found	that	TRIKE	contains	useful	elements	like	requirements	and	imple-
mentation	model.	However;	the	risk	model	is	experimental,	attack	trees	are	depre-
cated	and	the	model	has	multiple	layers	that	may	require	heavy	resource	invest-
ment.	The	major	problem	within	all	three	TRIKE	versions	is	that	each	of	them	is	un-
finished	based	on	found	data.	(Larcom	&	Saitta	2012).	The	TRIKE’s	website	is	outdat-
ed	and	not	updated	regularly.	(Larcom	2012).	The	first	version	has	status	DRAFT,	the	
second	version	1.5	status	is	unclear,	and	the	third	version	2	is	under	development.	
Hence,	the	threat	model	is	inadequate	for	production	environments	but	the	license	
model	supports	the	further	development	based	on	MIT	licence.	Basically,	usage	of	
TRIKE	requires	Excel’s	spreadsheets	or	the	standalone	tool,	however,	it	is	possible	to	
use	it	with	traditional	pen	and	paper	approach.	The	new	tool	for	TRIKE	version	2	is	
under	construction.	TRIKE	is	still	under	development;	however,	the	last	update	to	the	
home	pages	was	three	years	ago,	therefore,	the	project	state	is	unclear	to	the	au-
thor.	(Larcom	&	Saitta	2012,	Tools).	
	
The	author	tried	the	tool	and	the	spreadsheet	to	find	out	their	usability	for	health	
care	product	development	purposes.	It	just	turned	out	that	the	standalone	tool	and	
Excel	spreadsheets	were	likewise	unfinished.	The	standalone	tool	usability	is	simply	
cumbersome	and	it	lacks	intuitive	look	and	feel.	According	to	the	author,	the	model	
may	be	a	challenger	for	other	threat	models	in	future;	however,	the	threat	taxonomy	
is	very	limited	as	it	covers	only	elevation	of	privilege	and	denial	of	service	attacks	
(Saitta,	Larcom	&	Eddington	2005,	8).	Definitely	TRIKE	requires	a	vast	amount	of	re-
sources,	planning	and	training	before	the	model	could	be	a	part	of	the	organization’s	
daily	work	since	it	requires	overall	communication	between	stakeholders	and	securi-
ty	teams.		
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According	to	(Saitta,	Larcom	&	Eddington	2005,	14),	TRIKE	fits	for	waterfall	and	agile	
style	development;	however,	the	author’s	opinion	is	that	model	fits	easier	on	water-
fall	style	development	cycles.	The	model	expression	is	unfinished	and	therefore	it	is	
recommended	to	wait	for	the	version	2	before	further	evaluation.	In	future	TRIKE	
may	be	a	strong	challenger.	
	
8.7 OWASP	TOP-10	
OWASP	TOP-10	project	is	an	attack	library	and	very	popular	choice	on	web	applica-
tions	area.	However;	it	offers	only	10	most	exploited	security	vulnerabilities	towards	
web	applications	and	gives	biased	view	towards	security.	Usage	of	it	is	useful	for	ex-
ample	with	STRIDE	since	they	replenish	each	other.	However;	CAPEC	offers	much	
wider	attack	pattern	library	and	is	professionally	maintained.	OWASP	has	profession-
al	support;	however,	it	leans	heavily	towards	open	source	community	and	partici-
pants	do	not	have	specific	requirements	or	qualification.	The	model	is	gives	first	
stepping	stones	towards	threat	models	from	the	attack	library	point	of	view.	The	
model	is	not	recommended	as	only	model	towards	health	care	but	can	be	used	in	the	
beginning	to	understand	most	typical	threats	for	the	web	applications.	
	
Advantages	
• Easy	to	learn.	
• OWASP	offers	documentation	how	to	fix	these	security	flaws.	
	
Disadvantages	
• It	is	meant	for	web	applications	only.	
• It	is	an	open	source	community’s	product.		
• The	TOP-10	list	may	lead	to	falsified	understanding	and	denial	of	other	securi-
ty	flaws.	
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8.8 CAPEC	evaluation	
The	Common	Attack	Pattern	Enumeration	and	Classification	attack	library	is	one	of	
most	comprehensive	attack	libraries	available.	It	contains	attack	patterns	for	many	
different	domains	and	each	attack	is	documented	with	the	ID	and	clear	description.	
The	library	was	clearly	the	best	of	the	found	attack	libraries	and	contains	over	460	
different	attack	patterns.	Since	nowadays	programming	is	based	on	patterns	and	
object	oriented	programming,	the	CAPEC	approach	is	definitely	up	to	date.	However;	
latest	technology	is	not	covered	on	CAPEC	and	it	is	considered	as	negative	viewpoint.	
	
Advantages:	
• Comprehensive	(460+	attack	patterns)	
• Answers	technical	questions	whereas	STRIDE	cannot	do	that	
• Clear	predefined	library	structures	
• Typically	severity	of	attacks	described	
• Patterns	contains	many	helpful	descriptions	like	summary,	attack	execution	
flow,	attack	prerequisites,	typical	severity,	resources	required,	related	weak-
nesses	and	related	to	patterns.	
	
Disadvantages:	
• Not	gamification	approach.	Feels	complex	or	boring	for	many	users	
• New	technologies	are	not	represented	as	much	as	possible	
• No	clear	risk	based	approach	
	
	
8.9 Evaluation	of	the	ABA	attack	library	and	the	agile	threat	model	
future	development	
As	a	basis	for	ABA	attack	library	evaluation	its	ideation	and	cancellation	was	done	in	
spring	2015	without	knowledge	of	the	Intel’s	threat	agent	risk	model	and	without	the	
reasonable	workload	estimation	that	such	library	development	requires.	According	
to	Shostack	(2014,	31-34),	“Developing	a	new	library	requires	a	very	large	time	in-
vestment,	which	is	probably	part	of	why	there	are	so	few	of	them.”	That	is	also	the	
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main	reason	why	the	development	was	cancelled.	It	simply	consumes	too	much	time	
and	resources.	
	
The	cancellation	decision	was	made	referring	to	the	discussion	with	Tieto’s	repre-
sentative,	such	a	model	is	too	laborious	as	it	binds	at	minimum	one	person	for	re-
searching	threats	to	the	new	attack	library	development.	Additionally,	based	on	the	
author’s	own	estimation	a	new	model	needs	2	-	4	years	planning,	evaluation	and	
testing	with	continuous	improvements.	In	this	case	getting	resources	for	new	library	
development	was	not	an	option	so	that	research	path	was	abandoned	and	model	is	
the	first	version	without	any	specific	improvements.	To	summarize	practically,	the	
model	needs	more	development	and	evaluation	in	a	similar	way	as	any	existing	main	
risk	and	threat	models.	Additionally,	combining	the	new	threat	model	on	agile	area	
and	development	of	the	behaviour	based	threat	model	for	software	development	is	
clearly	worth	a	separate	thesis	or	even	a	doctoral	dissertation.	In	this	way	it	is	possi-
ble	to	collect	feedback	and	update	or	redefine	the	model.	It	is	important	to	notice	
that	the	unbiased	evaluation	is	not	possible	without	longitudinal	testing,	science	
community’s	feedback	and	iteration.	
	
The	basic	concept	of	the	model	is	simple:	investigate	news,	define	the	defence	pat-
tern	for	the	incident,	store	and	refine	the	data	to	the	database	and	eventually	apply	
library	in	reality.	The	model’s	strength	is	assumed	to	select	correct	defences	to	pre-
vent	and	mitigate	the	threats	in	the	best	possible	way	based	on	existing	knowledge	
of	old	threats	and	incidents.	A	certain	weakness	is	that	the	model	is	not	tested	in	real	
life	and	may	contain	design	flaws	due	to	too	straightforward	thinking.	The	current	
attack	library	model	needs	also	STRIDE	or	another	threat	model	as	a	support	since	
the	attack	library	does	not	take	interfaces	and	attack	vectors	into	account.	One	good	
risk	based	addition	could	be	Intel’s	TARA	model.	
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9 Conclusions	
9.1 Conclusions	on	research	questions	
What	appropriate	risk	and	security	models	already	exist?	
Based	on	research	appropriate	models	are	STRIDE,	DREAD,	DESIST,	CAPEC,	OWASP	
TOP-10,	WASC	Threat	Classification,	TRIKE,	P.A.S.T.A	and	TARA.	Project	management	
risk	methodologies	were	not	taken	under	evaluation	but	project	risk	evaluation	was	
used	in	one	workshop	after	applying	STRIDE	and	CAPEC.	Basically	also	project	risk	
evaluation	methods	apply	as	a	supplemental	method	to	the	existing	thread	models.	
However;	project	risk	methods	handling	was	not	a	part	of	the	thesis	scope.	Each	
method	has	its	advantages	and	disadvantages	but	the	selection	of	the	models	for	
further	evaluation	was	done	based	on	agile	development	frameworks,	literature	
analysis,	existing	models’	evaluation	and	based	on	discussions	on	author’s	and	
healthcare	representative	status	meetings.	The	own	ABA	attack	library	model	was	
result	of	research	done	in	spring	2015.	
	
Which	existing	risk	and	security	model	fits	best	for	health	care	software	develop-
ment	processes?	
Based	on	literature	research	and	evaluation,	suitable	models	for	agile	development	
were	STRIDE,	CAPEC,	OWASP	Top-10	and	TARA;	however,	Intel’s	TARA	was	found	in	a	
very	late	phase	and	thus	was	not	taken	into	further	investigation.	STRIDE	and	CAPEC	
were	selected	to	further	evaluation	since	they	were	the	most	promising	at	the	time.	
Based	on	questionnaire	results	from	the	teams	STRIDE	is	a	very	good	model	for	agile,	
and	the	training	method	was	the	right	choice	for	most	of	participants.	However;	
CAPEC	caused	some	difficulties	due	to	a	wrong	training	approach;	however,	it	defi-
nitely	helps	to	understand	the	attack	patterns	that	can	be	used	for	STRIDE	findings.	
The	gamification	style	training	of	the	STRIDE	and	practical	examples	are	good	step-
ping	stones	towards	more	serious	threat	modelling.	
	
P.A.S.T.A	was	probably	the	most	comprehensive	threat	model	and	maybe	suitable	
for	healthcare	purposes;	however,	fitting	it	to	the	agile	development	models	and	the	
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organizations	existing	processes	was	considered	too	difficult	and	time	consuming.	
Nevertheless,	it	is	definitely	one	of	the	models	that	should	be	taken	under	further	
evaluation	and	is	probably	good	choice	for	Master’s	degree	thesis	topic.	Likewise	
Intel’s	TARA	is	worth	of	further	evaluation.	The	own	ABA	based	attack	library	is	an	
attempt	to	develop	a	new	model	for	healthcare	purposes	but	the	development	in	
this	thesis	was	cancelled	in	May	2015.	
	
What	are	the	weaknesses	of	existing	models?	
The	following	table	contains	the	found	weaknesses	of	the	models	based	on	literature	
and	evaluation	by	development	teams.	
Model	 Weaknesses	
STRIDE	 High	level	model	and	no	viewpoint	towards	vulnera-
bilities	handling.	No	risk	evaluation	and	does	not	al-
ways	offer	solutions	for	threats.	Available	gamifica-
tion	approach	good	for	learning	the	model	but	not	
recommended	for	fully	organized	approach.	Using	of	
the	Threat	modelling	tool	is	recommended.	Does	not	
include	technical	defences.	
DREAD	 Already	obsolete	model.	According	to	literature	re-
view	may	lead	to	weird	results.	
DESIST	 Too	similar	and	no	proven	benefits	over	STRIDE.	
Found	only	one	reference	and	two	S	letters	on	acro-
nym	is	confusing.	
CAPEC	 Attack	library	is	clearly	difficult	to	promote	for	devel-
opment	teams	since	similar	viewpoint	of	viewpoint	of	
gamification	was	missing.	Not	suitable	as	an	only	
threat	model.	
OWASP	TOP-10	 Only	for	web	applications	and	contains	only	ten	most	
common	vulnerabilities.	Definitely	not	recommended	
as	an	only	threat	model.	
WASC	Threat	Classifica-
tion	
Obsoleted.	Attack	library	latest	version	released	
2010.	
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TRIKE	 Model	still	under	construction	and	no	literature	avail-
able.	Not	ready	enough	for	serious	development	us-
age.		
P.A.S.T.A	 Does	not	respond	needs	of	agile	development	teams.	
Difficult	to	include	on	Healthcare	area	processes	
without	a	great	deal	of	work.	
TARA	 Does	not	take	risk	impact	into	account.	Might	be	too	
heavy	model	for	agile	development	teams.	However;	
practical	testing	of	the	model	is	recommended.	
Brainstorming	methods	 Does	not	offer	sensible	security	viewpoint.	
ABA	attack	library	model	 Only	initial	version	created	without	practical	ap-
proach,	testing	and	iterations.	No	proof	that	model	
would	work	in	reality.	
	
	
Does	the	developed	health	care	specific	risk	and	threat	model	offer	better	risk	and	
security	management	than	generic	models?	
	
Eventually	the	author	ended	up	to	use	the	existing	models	STRIDE	and	CAPEC	since	
the	developed	ABA	attack	library	testing	and	building	would	require	a	vast	amount	of	
work	and	resources.	Since	there	are	no	practical	evaluations	done	for	the	ABA	attack	
library,	the	developed	model	does	not	currently	offer	better	risk	and	security	man-
agement	than	commonly	available	threat	models;	however,	it	is	possible	to	take	the	
ABA	attack	library	model	under	further	iterations	and	development	under	another	
study.	The	author	believes	that	simple	and	easily	understandable	threat	models	are	
key	to	better	security	in	future,	and	complex	threat	models	are	rarely	used.	
	
9.2 Summary		
The	objective	of	this	thesis	was	to	study	and	explore	a	variety	of	information	security	
risk	and	threat	models	and	select	or	develop	the	appropriate	model	for	healthcare	
unit’s	needs	of	the	domain.		
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The	result	of	the	research	project	was	definitely	positive	and	useful	for	Tieto’s	
Healthcare	and	Industrial	Internet	units	since	instead	of	one	domain	now	two	do-
mains	at	Tieto	can	use	selected	threat	models	to	improve	their	security	in	a	meaning-
ful	way.	Basically	the	tested	threat	models	should	fit	to	any	organization	in	Tieto	
which	follows	typical	agile	development	models.	They	should	fit	to	other	style	devel-
opment	workflows	as	well,	however,	this	thesis	concentrated	only	on	models	that	fit	
the	agile	methods.	
	
As	a	concrete	result	with	STRIDE	teams	fifty-two	findings	on	five	separate	workshops	
were	found.	Most	of	the	findings	were	mapped	to	CAPEC	attack	patterns.	The	big	
amount	of	findings	reveals	that	taking	security	viewpoints	into	account	with	threat	
modelling	in	design	phase	is	extremely	important;	however,	it	is	important	to	re-
member	that	threat	modelling	is	only	one	part	in	the	whole	security	processes.	The	
evaluated	systems	were	on	different	development	phases	and	some	of	them	are	go-
ing	to	production	in	2016.		
	
The	thesis	handled	multiple	different	threat	models	like	STRIDE,	DREAD,	DESIST,	
CAPEC,	OWASP	TOP-10,	WASC	Threat	Classification,	TRIKE,	P.A.S.T.A	and	TARA.	Also,	
Microsoft’s	SDL	and	brainstorming	methods	were	under	evaluation.	Additionally,	a	
new	model	was	invented	based	on	behaviour	sciences	area	and	certain	existing	
models.	The	author’s	own	model	was	personally	the	most	interesting;	however,	the	
model	was	abandoned	due	to	too	high	work	amount	to	develop	the	practical	imple-
mentation.		In	the	research	problem	chapter	it	was	mentioned	that	“Eventually	the	
goal	is	to	develop	a	new	model	based	on	the	best	parts	of	existing	models”;	however,	
that	was	not	the	case.	Actually,	the	existing	models	were	good	enough	and	they	met	
the	typical	agile	development	team’s	needs.	Cooperation	with	STRIDE	and	CAPEC	
offered	very	good	results.	
		
Based	on	literature	analysis	few	models	were	selected	as	applicants	for	practical	test-
ing	on	the	workshops.	The	models	were	STRIDE,	PASTA,	OWASP	TOP-10	and	CAPEC.	
Eventually	STRIDE	and	CAPEC	were	selected	since	they	looked	easy	to	learn	and	
should	not	consume	too	much	precious	development	time.	Also,	STRIDE’s	gamifica-
tion	approach	was	a	clear	benefit	but	it	was	unclear	where	and	who	has	used	the	
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gamification	approach	for	threat	model	training	in	reality.	OWASP	TOP-10	looked	
good	at	the	first	glance;	however,	it	contains	only	web	application	threats	and	only	
10	most	used	attack	vectors.	It	was	decided	to	ignore	other	OWASP	projects	since	
open	source	without	literature	is	very	difficult	to	evaluate	scientifically.	CAPEC	was	
selected	since	its	usage	is	not	difficult	and	its	attack	patterns	library	is	one	of	the	
strongest	available.	Intel’s	TARA	was	found	too	late	and	therefore	was	not	part	of	the	
evaluated	models.	
	
Originally	the	intention	was	to	use	software	development	teams	shadowing	to	collect	
data	of	threat	models	usage;	however,	practical	limitations	such	as	too	big	expenses	
to	the	company	declined	that	approach.	The	selected	multiple	choice	questions	are	
not	the	best	approach	for	this	kind	of	research	project	but	combining	it	with	the	wide	
literature	research	made	evaluation	possible.	Afterwards	it	is	also	easy	to	see	that	
instead	of	cross-sectional	time	horizon	longitudinal	would	be	more	reliable	for	evalu-
ation.	Workshops	with	STRIDE’s	gamification	approach	were	considered	successful	
and	a	good	way	to	give	a	good	start	to	the	threat	models	world;	however,	on	the	
other	hand	the	second	part	of	the	workshop	was	often	considered	as	boring	and	dif-
ficult	because	there	was	not	the	gamification	approach	or	vivid	examples.	
	
The	selected	research	philosophies	and	approaches	were	applicable	and	the	best	
choices	for	the	research	within	the	practical	limitations;	however,	the	time	horizon	
should	definitely	be	longitudinal.	Cross-sectional	approach	gives	only	a	preliminary	
idea	-	with	the	longitudinal	approach	the	research	could	be	more	reliable.	
	
Afterwards	it	is	easy	to	see	that	the	fourth	research	question	was	too	extensive	since	
it	required	the	creation	of	author’s	own	model	instead	of	evaluating	only	existing	
threat	models.	An	attempt	to	create	one’s	own	ABA	model	based	on	behaviour	sci-
ences	was	too	ambitious	in	the	planned	timeframe.	Actually,	about	four	months	of	
research	time	were	spent	for	that	specific	area;	however,	it	offered	a	new	viewpoint	
towards	threat	modelling	that	is	not	the	typical	way	to	handle	the	system	related	
threats.	Behaviour	science,	attack	libraries	and	agile	models	were	part	of	that	idea-
tion	and	research.	Areas	where	further	investigation	could	be	conducted	could	be	
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e.g.	development	of	a	simpler	model	to	prevent	espionage	and	terrorism	on	software	
development	area.		
	
9.3 Combined	effort	for	Healthcare	and	Industrial	Internet	units	
The	original	intention	was	to	conduct	the	research	for	Tieto’s	healthcare	unit	only.	
However;	Tieto’s	Telecom	unit’s	co-operating	negotiations	in	autumn	2014	opened	a	
possibility	to	move	on	new	organization.	Eventually	the	author	started	in	Tieto’s	In-
dustrial	internet	unit	in	January	2015	and	agreed	to	continue	the	thesis	few	weeks	
after.	Industrial	Internet	had	a	similar	need	for	the	threat	models	so	it	was	decided	to	
work	for	both	units	and	cancellation	of	the	ongoing	thesis	was	not	an	option	any-
more	without	losing	trust.		
	
Originally	the	intention	was	to	take	the	healthcare	teams	to	practical	tests	in	autumn	
2014	–	spring	2015.	Working	on	the	thesis	started	in	July	2015;	however,	the	thesis	
development	was	slow	and	the	author	concentrated	on	finishing	the	main	studies	in	
autumn	2014.	Most	of	the	work	has	been	done	in	April	2015	–	November	2015	and	
mainly	off	work	hours	despite	of	Industrial	Internet	unit’s	promise	to	use	available	
working	hours.	In	reality	there	was	very	little	time	to	write	the	thesis	during	work-
time.		
	
In	the	end	one	healthcare	team	and	four	Industrial	Internet	teams	participated	in	
practical	tests	due	to	the	tight	timetable	problems	of	the	healthcare	unit.	Three	In-
dustrial	Internet	teams	were	dropped	due	to	timetable	and	healthcare	unit	had	tight	
timetable	on	autumn	2015	so	that	is	why	only	one	healthcare	unit	participated.	The	
tests	were	executed	with	Swedish	and	Finnish	teams	and	eventually	combined	ef-
forts	really	made	it	possible	to	achieve	good	results	with	the	thesis.	The	total	calen-
dar	time	used	for	thesis	was	sixteen	months	starting	from	July	2014	and	ending	in	
November	2015.	The	longest	break	on	the	development	was	in	autumn	2014.	
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9.4 Further	research	
Research	revealed	several	possible	research	paths.	Following	topics	could	be	consid-
ered	in	future:	
	
1. One	possible	topic	is	the	ABA	attack	library	and	further	development	or	new	
ideation	and	evaluation	of	the	model.	It	may	apply	also	to	higher	studying	
levels.	Behaviour	and	threats	can	be	definitely	combined	to	a	simple	and	easi-
ly	usable	model;	however,	that	needs	more	ideation,	evaluation	and	practical	
testing	before	it	could	be	formed	as	a	fully	working	threat	model	instead	of	
simple	attack	library.		
2. Apply	gamification	and	threat	models	to	improve	learning	processes	and	
happiness	of	developers.	Idea	would	be	develop	rewarding	and	interesting	
training	based	on	gamification	theories	for	software	development	teams.		
3. Practical	research	project	of	P.A.S.T.A	or	Microsoft’s	SDL	to	the	big	organiza-
tions	own	processes.		
4. Develop	practical	work	instructions	for	developers	of	the	latest	version	of	Mi-
crosoft	threat	modelling	tool.	
5. Single	thesis	idea	is	to	adapt	TARA	–	Threat	Agent	Risk	Assessment	to	health	
care	purposes	and	build	own	Threat	Agent	Library	and	practical	usage	instruc-
tions.	
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Length 
30min – 60min 
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Why? 
•  Typically, old software is not safe (compare Windows 98 
to Windows 7) 
•  The new software will not get better without basic security 
knowledge 
•  Interest in the health care data increases all the time 
•  Because you do not want to get onto Iltalehti / Expressen 
frontpage due to your mistake 
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STRIDE history 
•  MSDN blogs: The threats to our products, Kohnfelder & 
Garg. 1st April 1999. 
•  The model defined by The Microsoft Security Task Force 
(invented by Kohnfelder & Garg 1999) 
•  Microsoft used also other security models: at least 
DREAD that deceased 2010. 
•  Part of the SDL Threat Modeling Process started in 2002 - 
2003 
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Acronym STRIDE stands for… 
6 
STRIDE threats and violations (adapted from Shostack, 2014, 62)  
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Advantages 
•  Investigation of the right defences for the possible attacks 
on the target system 
•  Possibility to use within attack libraries like CAPEC or 
OWASP -> may help a lot! 
•  No need to be a security nerd so suits for you J 
•  Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool 2016 supports STRIDE 
directly 
•  Easier to find defenses than on CAPEC (Shostack, 2014, 
106). 
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Disadvantages 
•  Might not be as lightweight as it sounds. 
•  Not the best (=easiest) choice as first model, well 
structured models are easier in the beginning. 
•  The vulnerabilities and the management of vulnerabilities 
not throughout covered 
•  Doesn’t take automation into account -> after all, 
investigation of the same issues is sometimes tedious 
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CAPEC 
•  Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification 
•  Over 460 different attack patterns 
•  Categorized by mechanisms of attack or domains of 
attack 
•  Supports Google search   
•  Sponsored by U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
•  Classification of common attacks  
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Advantages 
•  Attacks are represented as patterns that are applicable in 
different contexts 
•  Each entry completion and status is shown on the attack. 
•  One of most comprehensive attack libraries available 
•  Is not limited to web applications only 
•  Continuously improved and maintained 
•  Customized attack library possible 
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Disadvantages 
•  May lead in less creative thinking 
•  CAPEC might feel boring and/or difficult in beginning 
•  CAPEC offers classification of common attacks, STRIDE 
offers security properties (Shostack, 2014, 106). 
•  It is easier to recognize defences with STRIDE than with 
CAPEC 
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Usage 1/2 
•  Many different ways to use, team should select and agree 
appropriate way. One way is to use CAPEC’s two views. 
•  Organized by mechanisms of attack 
http://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/1000.html 
 
•  Organized by attack domains 
http://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/3000.html 
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Usage 2/2 
•  Direct usage: 
In clear cases just select the: 
CAPEC-66 SQL Injection, CAPEC-103: Clickjacking, 
CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery …  
 
•  Possibility to derive attack patterns to the own library 
(might consume vast amount of time). 
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Domains of attack 
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Mechanisms of Attack 
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Applying CAPEC 
•  Easier when you have a clue what to search 
•  System diagram or very good knowledge of system might 
be benefit 
•  Apply existing STRIDE findings for the CAPEC 
•  Apply OWASP TOP-10 attacks towards your system but 
with the CAPEC attack patterns 
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APPENDIX	C.	Questionnaire:	Security	risk	and	threat	models		
Questionnaire:	Security	Risk	and	Threat	Models	
This	questionnaire	aims	to	collect	experiences	of	the	selected	threat	models	for	agile	
development.	The	models	were	selected	based	on	literature	analysis	and	the	original	
requirements	were	given	by	Tieto's	representative.	The	data	in	the	questionnaire	will	
be	used	for	the	Master's	thesis	"Security	Risk	and	Threat	Models	for	Health	Care	
Product	Development	Processes"	for	JAMK	University	of	Applied	Sciences.	
*Required	
Background	data	
	
1. Role	*	
Mark	only	one	oval.	
	Developer	
	Test	engineer	
	Scrum	master	
	Product	owner	
	Project	manager	
	Ot- her:		
2. Did	 you	 participate	 to	 the	 threat	 model	 presentation	 held	 for	
your	team?	*	Mark	only	one	oval.	
	Yes	
	No	
	Partially	
	 	
		
	 	
3. Does	 the	 used	material	 support	 understanding	 of	 the	 selected	
threat	models?	*	
STRIDE	&	CAPEC	PowerPoint	presentations,	The	Elevation	of	Privilege	card	game	
Mark	only	one	oval.	
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
	
4. Do	you	have	a	cybersecurity	background?	*	
For	instance:	cybersecurity	training,	hobbyist	or	work	experi-
ence.	Mark	only	one	oval.	
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
	
STRIDE	
The	applied	threat	model	STRIDE	...	
5. is	easy	to	understand	and	apply?	*	Mark	only	one	oval.	
1 2	 3	 4	 5	
	
6. supported	me	to	recognize	the	risks	for	the	product?	*	
Mark	only	one	oval.	
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
	
7. supported	me	to	recognize	the	threats	for	the	product?	
*	Mark	only	one	oval.	
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
	
Poor	 Excellent	
No	security	related	
background	
Security	area	
professional	
Easy	 Hard	
Poor	 Excellent	
Poor	 Excellent	
	 	
		
	 	
8. supported	 me	 to	 recognize	 the	 vulnerabilities	 for	 the	
product?	*	Mark	only	one	oval.	
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
	
9. supported	 me	 to	 recognize	 the	 weaknesses	 for	 the	
product?	*	Mark	only	one	oval.	
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
	
10. suits	for	agile	development?	*	Mark	only	one	oval.	
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
	
CAPEC	
The	applied	threat	model	CAPEC	...	
11.	is	easy	to	understand	and	apply?	*	
Mark	only	one	oval.	
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
	
12. supported	 me	 to	 recognize	 the	 risks	 for	 the	 product?	 *	
Mark	only	one	oval.	
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
	
13. supported	me	to	recognize	the	threats	 for	 the	product?	*	
Mark	only	one	oval.	
Poor	 Excellent	
Poor	 Excellent	
Poor	 Excellent	
Easy	 Hard	
Poor	 Excellent
	 	
		
	 	
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
	
14. supported	me	to	recognize	the	vulnerabilities	for	the	prod-
uct?	*	Mark	only	one	oval.	
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
	
15. supported	me	 to	 recognize	 the	weaknesses	 for	 the	 prod-
uct?	*	Mark	only	one	oval.	
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
	
16. suits	for	agile	development?	*	Mark	only	one	oval.	
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
	
Advantages,	disadvantages	and	improvement	proposals	
17	 STRIDE	threat	model	advantages?	*	
	
18.	STRIDE	threat	model	disadvantages?	*	
Poor	 Excellent	
Poor	 Excellent	
Poor	 Excellent	
Poor	 Excellent	
	 	
		
	 	
						 	
19.	CAPEC	threat	model	advantages?	*	
							 	
20.	CAPEC	threat	model	disadvantages?	*	
	
21.	Improvement	proposals	regarding	to	the	threat	models	usage?	
For	instance:	Would	you	like	to	use	some	other	way	during	sprints	like	threat	
modelling	software,	planning	on	the	whiteboard	or	something	else?	
	
	
	 	
	 	
		
	 	
22.	 Improvement	proposals	regarding	to	the	training?	
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